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This thesis is a case study of the pro-poor part of the Information 
Communication Technology (ICT) policy in South Africa. It utilizes 
government policy documents and interviews with bureaucrats to understand 
the pro-poor intentions of the ICT policy and the tools and structures chosen to 
achieve them. It found that the intentions were to provide ICT services to poor 
communities in telecentres, households and schools. To achieve this three 
implementation channels were established: (i) the telecentre channel, which 
consisted of a Universal Service and Access Agency in charge of paying 
subsidies from a Universal Service And Access Fund to establish telecentres; 
(ii) the market channel, which consisted of an independent regulator in charge 
of issuing and enforcing universal service obligations to ICT companies to 
provide access to ICT in households and schools; and (iii) and the education 
channel, which consisted of a structure within the provincial Department of 
Education aiming to provide ICT to schools.  
This thesis then uses data collected from fieldwork in three poor communities 
in KwaZuluNatal to assess and explain the results of the three channels on the 
ground. Despite political backing and significant funding the policy was only 
partially successful. The telecentre and market channels were largely 
unsuccessful, while the education channel was relatively successful. It is argued 
that the variation in results can, to a large extent, be explained by differences in 
the tools and structures that were utilized by the channels. The two less 
successful channels were both centralized at the national level and relied on 
third parties – which they found difficult to control – for implementation at the 
local level. The education channel, on the other hand, relied on direct delivery 
through a decentralized bureaucracy. This thesis provides tentative but 
empirically founded support to the argument that direct tools, which rely on 
hierarchic bureaucracies, tend to be easier to implement and more effective 
than indirect tools relying on third parties. This might be particularly true in 
context of South Africa, where state institutions lack the capacity to manage 








List of Figures 
Figure 1: Conceptual model of the policy process ......................................... 18 
Figure 2: Map of South Africa with study area of KwaZulu-Natal marked. ... 39 
Figure 3: Map of KwaZulu-Natal with case communities marked ................. 39 







List of Tables 
Table 1: Usage indicators for computers and the internet............................... 36 
Table 2: Number of schools and telecentres visited in the three communities 40 
Table 3: Distribution of informants in the three implementation channels...... 41 
Table 4: Respondents to the CLIQ survey ..................................................... 45 
Table 5: Intentions, tools and state implementing organisations of the ICT to 
the poor policy ............................................................................................... 56 
Table 6: Universal Service Obligations after the first round of legislation in 
1996 ............................................................................................................... 63 
Table 7: Universal Service Obligations after the second round of legislation in 
2001 ............................................................................................................... 64 
Table 8: Delivery channels for the ICT to the poor policy in South Africa..... 70 
Table 9: Characteristics of the three implementation channels....................... 71 
Table 10: Performance indicators for the three implementation channels....... 74 
Table 11: Output indicators for the telecentre channel ................................... 76 
Table 12: Households access to ICTs in poor communities ........................... 82 
Table 13: Number of schools with internet and an E-rate in the three case 
communities................................................................................................... 84 
Table 14: Output indicators for the education channel ................................... 86 
Table 15: Outputs on the ground in three communities .................................. 88 
Table 16: Computer and internet use among CLIQ respondents .................... 88 
9 
 
List of Abbreviations 
ANC - African National Congress 
DoC – Department of Communications 
DoE – Department of Education 
ECA - Electronic Communications Act 2005 
ECT – Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 2002 
GCIS - Government Communication and Information Services 
GEAR - Growth, Employment and Reconstruction macro economic strategy 
ICASA – Independent Communications Regulator of South Africa (previously 
SARTRA)  
ITU – International Telecommunication Union 
ISAD plan – Information Society and Development Plan 
KZN – KwaZulu-Natal 
PDoE - Provincial Department of Education 
PNC on ISAD – Presidential National Commission on the Information Society 
RDP - Reconstruction and Development Program 
SATRA – South African Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (Later 
renamed ICASA) 
TCA -Telecommunications Act of 1996 
TCAA - Telecommunications Amendment Act 2001 
USA – Universal Service Agency (later USAASA) 
USAASA – Universal Service and Access Agency of South Africa (previously 
USA) 
USF – Universal Service Fund (Later USAF) 
USAF – Universal Service and Access Fund (Previously USF) 





   1. Introduction 
Castells (2000) argues that we have entered into a new era, the ‘Information 
Age’. In this epoch ‘information technology and the ability to adapt to it and 
use it, is the critical factor in generating and accessing wealth, power and 
knowledge’ (ibid:92). Consequently, people and areas 
that are non-valuable from the perspective of ‘information capitalism’ and 
that do not have significant political interest for the power that be, are 
bypassed by flows of wealth and information, and ultimately deprived the 
basic technological infrastructure that allows us to communicate, innovate, 
produce, consume and even live, in today’s world (ibid:72). 
Hence, the lack of access to information and communication technology (ICT) 
is one of the most serious deprivations of our time.  
Africa has been largely excluded from the technology revolution that brought 
about the Information Age. Sub-Saharan Africa ranks at the bottom of the 
world regions on the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) ICT 
Development Index, which measures access to, skills and usage of ICTs. In 
2007 less than 5% of the African population used the internet compared to 15% 
in Asia and 43% in Europe (ITU 2009:4). South Africa is, however, often seen 
as the exception in sub-Saharan Africa (Castells 2000) and is the highest 
ranking African nation in the ICT Development Index (ITU 2009).  
In order to grasp the situation in South Africa it must be understood that 
although it is a unitary state, as a result of apartheid, it encapsulates both 
developed and developing societies. In this sense it is a mesocosm of the world. 
There are enormous disparities in wealth, power and information between the 
previously advantaged white urban elite and the previously disadvantaged 
predominantly black majority. In his 2003 state of the nation speech, erstwhile 
President Mbeki talked about South Africa having a ‘structural fault’ in terms 
of a ‘dual economy and society’ in which ‘one is modern and relatively well 
developed’ and ‘the other is characterized by underdevelopment and an 




GDP, contains a big percentage of our population, incorporates the poorest of 
our rural and urban poor, is structurally disconnected from both the first and the 
global economy and is incapable of self generated growth and development’ 
(Mbeki 2003 in Devey et al. 2006:1).  
This understanding of South Africa’s socioeconomic problems informed the 
Mbeki administration’s modernization project, which attempted to combine 
enhanced growth in the first economy with targeted interventions in the second 
economy to expand social provision and ‘relieve the poverty and suffering 
afflicting these masses of our people’ (Mbeki 2003). A part of this 
modernization project has been the extension of ICT services to previously 
disadvantaged areas. This is apparent in a letter written in 2001, in which 
Mbeki stated that the Information Technology revolution ‘has to take place 
essentially in the black urban and rural areas, which are our own domestic 
Third World relative to the historically White First World’ (Mbeki 2001). 
These intentions can, however, be traced further back. When apartheid ended in 
1994 communication services were concentrated in white urban areas and 
largely absent in black rural areas. The Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP), first socioeconomic policy of the post-apartheid 
government, estimated that there was less than one telephone line per 100 black 
persons compared with about 60 per 100 whites (ANC 1994:2.8.1). The 
situation in rural black areas was even worse. A central goal of the post-
apartheid government was to provide ICT services to the previously 
disadvantaged population: 
The telecommunications sector is an indispensable backbone for the 
development of all other socio-economic sectors. An effective 
telecommunications infrastructure, which includes universal access, is 
essential to enable the delivery of basic services and the reconstruction and 
development of deprived areas (ANC 1994:2.8.3). 
In 1996, the ANC changed its economic policy from the broad socioeconomic 
development programme of the RDP to a narrow focus on growth in the 
neoliberal Growth, Redistribution and Development Programme (GEAR). 
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Throughout the post-apartheid era, sectoral policies have been developed 
aiming both to meet the broad goals of the RDP programme, but at the same 
time adhering to the fiscal discipline of the GEAR. The wish to reconcile 
GEAR’s emphasis on growth and RDP’s emphasis on meeting basic needs was 
reflected in the first White Paper on Telecommunications in post-apartheid 
South Africa. This ambiguity can be seen in the vision of the White Paper in 
the following excerpts: 
The state’s vision for telecommunications is one that balances the provision 
of basic universal service to disadvantaged rural and urban communities with 
the delivery of high-level services capable of meeting the needs of a growing 
South African economy (Ministry of Post, Telecommunications and 
Broadcasting 1996:17.1.1). 
The state recognizes the central importance of access to telecommunications 
to the achievement of its social and economic goals. Affordable 
communications for all, citizens and business alike, throughout South Africa 
is at the core of its vision and the goal of this policy (ibid:1.2). 
The vision must therefore reconcile these two seeming opposites within an 
integrating framework which also allows for a dynamic definition of 
universal service and facilitates the co-ordination of all available 
infrastructure behind its goal (ibid:1.3). 
However, the policy specifically recognizes the internal disparities in South 
Africa and hence has the provision of telecommunications to the poor as the 
immediate target of the universal service policy: 
While universal service is a global concern, it is located within a unique 
context in South Africa. Nowhere else does such disparity of access exist side 
by side with a developed communications technology sector. Nowhere else 
are both access and ownership concentrated so heavily in one population 
group. These imbalances, which are the legacy of apartheid, must be urgently 
redressed. Members of historically disadvantaged communities, and 
particularly those in rural areas, must be the immediate targets for the 
delivery of universal service (ibid:1.1.4).  
Between 1999 and 2008 the private operators in the telecommunications sector 
contributed a total amount of 636 million Rands (496 million NOK) to the 
Universal Service and Access Fund (USAASA 2008a). This fund was 
dedicated to cover the cost of provision and usage for ‘needy persons’ in un-
served areas of the country – which basically referred to the previously 
disadvantages areas.    
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It is evident, therefore, that there were both political will and a significant 
amount of funding dedicated to the provision of ICT to the poor. This thesis 
investigates and explains how far the pro-poor policy intentions of the ICT 
policy have been realised in post-apartheid South Africa. To this end it attempts 
to address the following research question: 
To what extent and why has South Africa’s post-apartheid ICT to the poor 
policy been successful?  
In order to discuss a potential answer the research question this thesis 
undertakes a policy analysis. The answer to the overall research question will 
thus be discussed on the basis of the answers to the following sub-questions: 
I.  What are the policy intentions of the ICT to the poor policy? 
II. How is the policy implemented?  
III. What are the results on the ground? 
IV. What can explain the results? 
The rationale of this study is fourfold. First, it aims to describe the policy 
intentions of the ICT to the poor policy. Second, it aims to explore the 
implementation structures and processes. Third, it considers the results in three 
poor communities. Fourth, based on the answers to the first three questions, the 
thesis puts forward explanations for the variations in results on the ground. 
Policy analysis is a practical discipline and it can be defined as ‘a process of 
multidisciplinary inquiry designed to create, critically assess, and communicate 
information that is useful in understanding and improving policy’ (Dunn 
2007:1). The thesis thus aims to come up with explanations that are useful to 
improving policy, but also to generate interesting questions for further research.  
The data used in this thesis were collected through a combination of fieldwork 
and desk study. In the desk study, a review of government policy papers and 
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parliamentary acts was conducted in order to understand and describe the 
policy intentions and tools. I conducted fieldwork from October to December 
2008 in order to understand the actual implementation structures in place, the 
implementation process and the results on the ground in poor communities. In 
the field, access to ICT in schools, telecentres and households in three poor 
communities were investigated. In total 45 interviews were conducted with the 
actors involved in implementation process. The informants ranged from 
telecentre managers and teachers on the ground to high-ranking bureaucrats in 
Pretoria. 
I would argue that my thesis contributes to gaps in the literature in two ways. 
Firstly, the vast majority of literature on governance and tools is concerned 
with Europe and the United States. It has, therefore, been developed in the 
context of western, modern nation-states with a monopoly of the means of 
violence and the capacity to implement and enforce central decisions (Risse 
and Lehmkuhl 2006). However, majority of states in the world have limited 
statehood in the sense that they lack the capacity to enforce central decisions or 
face challenges to their monopoly of violence in certain areas (ibid).   In these 
‘areas of limited statehood’ governance is likely to function differently than the 
governance models of the western, modern nation state predicts because the 
state are not legal-rational bureaucracies and the markets often don’t function 
well as they are often dominated by state-owned monopolies (Noll 2000:183).  
Secondly, most policy research on service delivery to the poor in South Africa 
focuses on basic services such as education, water, sanitation and electricity 
(Pape and McDonald 2005). Few empirical studies have considered the 
purported potential of ICTs to reduce marginalisation and social exclusion 
(Castells 2000). This thesis contributes to both areas in the sense that it looks at 
pro-poor governance in a technological policy sector in a transitional country.   
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two puts forward an analytical 
framework to orientate the empirical study. This analytical framework 
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discusses key theoretical contributions in order to outline the concepts that are 
important to the analysis.  Chapter three describes the research design and 
methodology. Chapter four to seven address the four sub-questions outlined 
above. Chapter four considers the intentions of South Africa’s post-apartheid 
ICT to the poor policy; chapter five analyses the channels through which the 
policy is implemented; chapter six evaluates the performance of the policy on 
the ground, and chapter seven attempts to explain why the policy produced the 
results it did. Chapter eight concludes by summarising the findings of the thesis 




2. Analytical Framework 
This thesis analyses the ICT to the poor policy from a governance perspective. 
A governance perspective entails a broadening of the traditional approach taken 
on the public sector in public administration and public policy research. 
Scholars in public administration and policy research traditionally assumed that 
‘the public sector functions best when it was apolitical, structured as a 
hierarchy, and based on a system of merit-recruitment and promotion’ (Kjær 
2004:4). However, this traditional notion was challenged by scholars criticising 
the effectiveness of public bureaucracies. During the 1980s, a wave of New 
Public Management reforms was implemented in many countries, which 
involved privatization, decentralisation and agencification (ibid). In addition, 
non-public actors were increasingly involved in delivering public services. This 
led to an increased fragmentation of the public sector. Governance research on 
policy implementation hence broadens the focus to include a variety of public 
and non-public actors involved in the pursuit of public goals (Kjær 2004:4-5)    
A governance perspective directs attention away from questions of why policies 
are adopted and pursued to those regarding how they are designed and 
implemented and what results they produce (Jreisat 2002:1).  It focuses the 
analysis on the structures and processes of decision-making and, more 
importantly, on their consequences in terms of implementation and results 
(ibid:3). A governance perspective, therefore, focuses on the organisational 
aspects of the state and especially how it involves various non-public actors, 
such as NGOs and private companies, in its effort to pursuit public goals (Kjær 
2004:5). Transferred to this thesis, the question of this thesis entails a focus on 
how the ICT to the poor policy is designed and implemented and what results 
they produce on the ground in three poor communities.  
As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis conducts a policy analysis of the 
ICT to the poor policy in South Africa. There are many ways of conducting a 
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policy analysis, but this thesis has chosen an instrumental tools approach to 
study the policy process, structures and results that follow the adoption of the 
policy intentions. The tools approach links the governance literature to the 
wider literature on policy research in political administration and political 
science by directing attention to the tools chosen to achieve public goals and 
their different organisational structure which can involve both public and non-
public actors (Pierre and Peters 2000:42).   
This way of thinking about policy focuses attention on the tools that the 
government has at its disposal in order to achieve political objectives and the 
congruence or incongruence between these different tools and the 
government’s goals. The basic argument of the tools approach is that the choice 
of policy tools to achieve public goals significantly structures the 
implementation process and therefore affects the results in the particular policy 
sector in question (Salamon 2001:11). Hence, the choice of tools or instruments 
can significantly enhance or reduce the effectiveness of the policy 
implementation process (Peter and Van Nispen 1998; Pierre and Peters 2000; 
and Salamon 2001).  
Different tools rely on different implementation structures and create different 
implementation processes. It is assumed that certain tools and structures are 
better in reaching certain objectives such as equity objectives than others 
(Salamon 2001). However, the way a tool is interpreted and implemented is 
influenced by the particular national and local context and policy sector in 
which it is used.  
Based on the 4 sub-questions posed in the introduction, a conceptual model has 
been developed in order to guide the empirical investigation in this thesis. 
The first question is what are the policy intentions? This question refers to the 
first independent variable in the thesis, which is the policy intentions as stated 
in central government documents.  The second question is how is the policy 
implemented? This question refers to the second independent variable in the 
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thesis, which is the implementation of the ICT to the poor policy. The 
implementation is operationalized as three implementation channels consisting 
of different tools, structures and consequently processes in place to achieve the 
overall goal of providing ICT services to the poor. The third question is what 
are the results on the ground? This question refers to the dependent variable in 
the thesis, which is the results of the three channels on the ground in three poor 
communities in South Africa. The final question is what can explain the 
results?  
The tools approach is an instrumental perspective. An instrumental perspective 
assumes that the tools and structures chosen in the policy design are chosen in 
order to reach the public goal and that the tools and structures chosen in the 
policy design alter the behaviour in the policy process and the results on the 
ground (Christensen et al. 2007:30). Hence, the variations in the results on the 
ground can be explained with reference to the variations in tools and structures 
chosen. Finally, the special features of the policy studied, which is the ICT to 
the poor policy, and the country context which is South Africa will influence 
the way the policy is formulated and implemented. These are the contextual 








Figure 1: Conceptual model of the policy process  
 
Results on the ground 








The aim of this chapter is not to comprehensively discuss the plurality of 
theories and their respective strengths and weaknesses. Rather, it aims to 
purposefully select theories and approaches that convey an analytical 
contribution to the questions and conceptual framework presented in figure 1. 
The first part of the chapter discusses the tools approach, the second part 
describes the elements in the conceptual framework, and the final section sets 
out the approach for evaluating the policy process and results.   
2.1 Policy intentions 
The policy intentions are stated in public policies. ‘Public policies sets forth 
courses of action for addressing problems and for providing goods and services 
to segments of the society’ (May 2003:223). Hence public policies set out a 
course of action for what would like to be achieved. However, they do more 
than simply setting out the objectives of the policy. They also ‘typically contain 
a set of intentions or goals, a mix of instruments or means for accomplishing 
the intentions, a designation of governmental or non-governmental entities 
charged with carrying out the intentions, and an allocation of resources for the 
requisite tasks’ (ibid).  Hence, public policies state the desired course of action 
and structure the implementation process (ibid: 224).  
An extensive literature on implementation failure finds that inadequate 
specification of policy goals and the desired action as well as an inadequate 
inclusions of features to overcome basic conflicts in the implementation 
process can lead to implementation failure (May 2003:224). The top-down 
implementation literature has argued that the inadequate specification of  goals, 
complex implementation structures and indirect control which involves 
multiple actors, decision point and levels of action as well as unsupportive 
political environments have been key reasons behind policy failure 
(Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983; Van Meter and Van Horn 1975). 
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 A central assumption in this thesis is that the choice of tools and their 
implementation structures as stated in the policy design structure the 
implementation process, which in turn affects the results of the policy on the 
ground. However, this assumption can be criticised as the choice of tools is not 
a purely technical affair of choosing the goals that are most likely to achieve 
the goal. Instead, the choice of tools is a profoundly political endeavour (Peters 
2001). The choice of tools is influenced by a range of factors, which include 
interests, ideologies and the international environment (ibid:552-59). Firstly, 
the choice of tools structure the implementation process and determines to 
whose advantage the discretion of the policy process can be used. (Salamon 
2001:11). For example, public bureaucracies have the opportunity to affect 
implementation when direct government tools are chosen, while private sector 
service providers and non-governmental organisations gain from the choice of 
indirect policy tools (Peters 2001:560-61).  
Secondly, different ideas and ideologies influence the choice of tools. Actors 
on the left side of politics tend to favour direct policy tools and implementation 
through hierarchical bureaucracies, because they are seen as more effective at 
achieving equity objectives (ibid:556). Those on the right of the political 
spectrum, on the other hand, typically prefer indirect policy tools and market 
solutions as these are thought to be cost-efficient, disguise government 
involvement and leave a wider arena to public choice  (Peters 2001; Salamon 
2001). Finally, the choice of tools is affected by the international environment. 
The neoliberal New Public Management reforms implemented in the 1980s and 
1999, for example, emphasised market-based solutions to public problems. 
These were exported to developing countries through the World Bank’s 
Structural Adjustments Programmes, which rewarded governments that 
adopted pro-market policy measures and tools (Peters 2001:558).  
Although certain aspects of this will be touched upon when the policy 
intentions of the ICT to the poor policy is discussed in the empirical part of this 
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thesis, a full discussion of the ranger of factors affecting the policy formulation 
process is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
2.2 Implementation Channels 
As seen above, public policies  ‘typically contain a set of intentions or goals, a 
mix of instruments or means for accomplishing the intentions, a designation of 
governmental or non-government entities charged with carrying out the 
intentions’ (May 2003:223). An implementation channel in this thesis refers to 
the tools chosen, the implementation structure and the implementation process 
structured by these. The implementation process refers to the activities and 
behaviour that takes place over a certain period of time in the aftermath of the 
adoption of policy intentions, while the structure refers to the frame of rules 
and role expectations within which the implementation process occur 
(Christensen et al. 2007:27). 
2.2.1 Tools 
The concept of a tool or an instrument to achieve public objectives is quite easy 
to comprehend in theory. When turning to the real world, however, a tool is 
quite difficult to describe and the concept has been used to refer to a wide range 
of empirical phenomena. Instruments can be characterized as an object and as 
an activity (Peters and Van Nispen 1998:13). If understood as an object, it 
refers to the instructions or rules in public acts. Understood as an activity, it 
refers to ‘a collection of policy activities that show similar characteristics 
focused on influencing and governing social processes’ (ibid:14). This thesis 
uses the former definitions and sees a tool as an object specified in public acts.  
However, more broadly, this thesis relies on Salamon (2001) who defines a tool 
of public action as ‘an identifiable method through which collective action is 
structured to address a public problem’ (ibid). This definition implies that the 
choice of tools made by policy makers in the policy design structure 
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implementation as they define the actors involved, their roles and the 
relationships between these (ibid:19).  
However, every tool has an implementation structure in terms of an 
organisation or a set of organisations. Salamon (ibid) includes the structure in 
the concept of a tool and understands the structure simply as one dimension of 
the tool. This thesis has a similar understanding, but instead of including the 
implementation structure in the concept of a tool it will use the concept of a 
tool to denote the object chosen in the acts – what Salamon (ibid) calls the 
‘vehicle’ – and implementation structure to refer to the organisational structure 
that carries out the intention and tool. 
Since channels are in reality packages of different attributes, they can be 
grouped differently based on the dimension one chooses to look at. This thesis 
has chosen to group tools according to the nature of their implementation 
structures and specifically the extent of their directness. Directness here refers 
to ‘the extent to which the entity authorizing, financing or inaugurating a 
collective activity is involved in carrying it out’ (ibid:27). The concept rests on 
the observation that any effort to deliver services is made up of several 
activities that are not necessarily carried out by the same entity. The more one 
institution is involved in the authorization, funding and delivery, the more 
direct the tool is. An idealtypisch direct tool is thus a tool were government 
institution does everything, while an indirect tool is on where these functions 
are subcontracted to various actors, such a semiautonomous agencies, 
community groups, non-profit organisations or private companies. The more 
extensively functions are carried out by third parties, the more indirect the tool 
is (ibid).  
Salamon (2001) argues that indirect and direct tools have relative strengths 
with relation to the evaluation criteria set out above. This section will briefly 
set out his arguments. 
23 
 
Salamon (2001) argues that the choice of indirect policy tools is likely to have 
several benefits for the cost-efficiency of a policy.  Firstly, indirect policy tools 
can inject competition into the provision of public services and thus break the 
monopoly of governmental agencies or state-owned companies (ibid:31). 
Secondly, indirect tools can also provide access to skills and investments that 
are needed to cope with complex public problems, but that public agencies may 
not possess (ibid). Thirdly, indirect tools are more flexible. This makes it easier 
for governments to experiment and change course when needed to remain 
responsive to new needs. This is because the government is only involved in 
authorizing and does not have to create the entire bureaucratic structure to 
implement an initiative (ibid).  
It is widely argued, however, that indirect policy tools have several 
disadvantages with respect to effectiveness, manageability and equity.  Firstly, 
indirect tools are often less effective and much more difficult to manage than 
direct tools. They are difficult to manage because, rather than using direct 
implementation through hierarchical bureaucracies, they rely on third parties 
with different goals and actors. New economic theories of organisation have 
shown that hierarchical inter-organisational principal-agent relations within 
bureaucracies are easier to manage than intra-organisational relationships 
between the governments and third parties such as private companies and 
NGOs (Salamon 2001:31). When several different organisations are involved in 
a task, the chances increase that principals and agents have different interests 
and values and this creates high costs related to bargaining and delays in 
bargaining (ibid). The more scattered the authority, therefore, and the more 
interests and values diverge, the greater the risk of principal-agent problems, 
goal displacement and consequently ineffectiveness.  
This is one of the central findings in the top-down implementation literature 
from the 1970s and 1980s (Pressman and Wildawsky 1973; Mazmanian and 
Sabatier 1983; Hogwood and Gunn 1984). Pressman and Wildawsky (1973) 
argue that even when a policy has clear goals, success is not guaranteed when 
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implementation relies on multiple actors. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983:27) 
claim that one of the most important conditions for successful implementation 
is that implementation structures should be hierarchically integrated both 
between and within implementing institutions. They argue that if the 
implementing system is only loosely integrated, there will be considerable 
variation in the extent to which the implementing officials and target groups 
comply with the central decision as each group responds and adapts to the 
incentives for modification within their local setting (ibid). Hogwood and Gunn 
(1984:199-206) recommend, as one of ten criteria for successful 
implementation, ‘that there is a single implementing agency that need not 
depend upon other agencies for success, or, if other agencies must be involved, 
that the dependency relationships are minimal in number and importance’. 
However, it seems apparent that not all third party arrangements affect 
implementability and effectiveness the same way. Indeed, the type of third 
party a tool involves affects to what extent public goals are achieved. Public 
sector managers for human service programs tend to favour contracts with non-
profit actors over contracts with profit actors because non-profit actors are 
more likely to share the goals of the public sector (Salamon 2001:32). When 
the public sector as the principal and agent do not share a common goal, then 
the task of ensuring that the agent fulfils the principal’s goals becomes much 
more complex and problematic (ibid).  
Finally, it is suggested that direct tools are more appropriate than indirect tools 
when the overall goal is equity or redistribution because third parties and 
especially private companies do not necessarily share the same equity goals as 
the government (Salamon 2001:32). Unless they are provided with incentives 
to achieve such goals, they are not likely to work towards them. Nevertheless, 
private companies are often pulled into the policy process without being given 
incentives to deliver services to the poor. The result is that providers will work 
to attract consumers who will enhance their profits rather than to provide 
services to the poor (Herzlinger in Salamon 2001:32). 
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2.2.2 Implementation structures 
Salamon (2001) links the tools approach to the new governance literature. He 
argues that the most important change in the United States’ public sector since 
the Second World War was the shift from using direct tools relying on 
bureaucracies to achieve public goals to indirect tools that utilise more complex 
market and network structures involving third parties such as private companies 
and NGOs (Salamon 2001:1-2). This is a version of the familiar observation 
made by most of the governance literature which uses the concept of 
governance to describe the contemporary setting of western governance as 
distinct from the weberian  hierarchical bureaucracies dominating 
implementation in the planning era of the 1960s and1970s and the market-
dominated 1980s (Hill and Hupe 2009:14). The contemporary governance 
epoch has evolved as a realization, it is argued, that the government cannot do 
everything itself, but neither can it expect the market to resolve all public 
problems (ibid). Hence, it engages with third parties such as private companies 
and NGOs to solve public problems and reach public goals (ibid). 
The governance literature discusses three models of coordinating public action, 
which predominate in each of these periods. These are respectively hierarchies, 
markets and networks (Pierre and Peters 2000; Thompson 2003; Kjær 2004). 
Thompson (2003:22) argues that the key feature of hierarchy is that is requires 
some form of rule-driven design or direction. It requires explicit, deliberative 
action towards an agreed upon goal. Kjær (2004) connects hierarchies to the 
notion of a western, liberal democracy and Weber’s concept of an idealtypisch 
legal-rational bureaucracy. Policy goals are formulated by elected officials and 
implemented directly by neutral and hierarchically organized bureaucracies. 
Hierarchies are a structured mechanism of control, designed to run big and 
complex organisations like public bureaucracies (Thompson 2003:23). It 
usually involves a layered or tiered organisational structure often referred to as 
divisions or departments that are organised in super ordination or subordination 
of authority and power (ibid:24). The focus is on control over the 
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implementation process through a top-down command structure with a 
downward flow of directions to ensure that the whole chain act together to 
achieve the collective purpose (ibid). Such hierarchical organisational models 
can be both intra-organisational and inter-organisational. Pierre and Peters 
(2000) connects the hierarchical model of service delivery to the post-war era 
in Europe, which was characterized by great faith in the state to deliver services 
and achieve socioeconomic development.  
In the 1980s the hierarchical model of governance came under increasing 
pressure as the political climate in the west was changed by the neoliberal 
policies of Thatcher in Britain and Reagan in the United States. From being the 
solution to public problems, the bureaucracy was increasingly seen as the cause 
of public problems (Kjær 2004:24). Instead of public bureaucracies, the market 
and its core mechanism of supply and demand were seen as the most efficient 
and effective way of allocating goods in a society. The core feature of the 
market is that it claims to organize and coordinate economic activity without 
any conscious organising centre. It involves a competitive process in which 
suppliers compete to offer goods and services at the lowest prices to the 
customers who make their decision based on price. If there is only one seller – 
that is if there is a monopoly - the monopolist can manipulate the market to its 
own advantage and against the interest of the majority (Thompson 2003:26).  
This criticism provided the intellectual and ideological basis for the New Public 
Management (NPM) reforms aimed at improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the public sector (Kjær 2004:25; Christensen and Lægreid 
2007: 4). Central structural changes adopted under the label of NPM reforms 
were the privatization of public companies, the contracting out of service 
delivery to private companies, the emphasis on market liberalisation and 
competition, the creation of single purpose agencies and decentralisation (Kjær 
2004:25-31).  
The increased fragmentation of the public sector that resulted from these 
reforms has led to increased scholarly focus on ‘networks’ as a third delivery 
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structure for public services (Kjær 2004:5). This model is often seen as a hybrid 
involving elements of both hierarchical and market models. Some scholars see 
it as the most common structure of governance in modern societies (Pierre and 
Peters 2000:19). The organisational structure in a network tends to be formally 
flat, but in reality there are often significant differences in power and authority 
between the various participants in the network. The notion of a network rejects 
the sharp distinction between political and private interests, which is a central 
precondition in both public administration and market approaches. It focuses 
instead on the collaborative nature of relationships between the public and a 
range of third party actors such as NGOs, communities and private companies 
(Salamon 2001:16). In the governance literature on western countries, networks 
are understood to work through loyalty and trust rather than prices as in the 
market model or administrative order as in the hierarchy structure (Thompson 
2003:31).  
2.3 Context  
2.3.1 Governance in an African context  
In South Africa, there has been an increasing adoption of policy tools that 
require the involvement of the private sector and civil society actors in the 
policy process in order to achieve public goals (Mhone and Edigheji 2003:2). 
Hence, market and network structures involving third parties have become 
increasingly common in service delivery in South Africa.   
However, the governance literature, and the description of the models of 
governance cited above, tends to concentrate on an ideal type of the western, 
modern nation-state with the capacity to implement and enforce central 
decisions (Risse and Lehmkuhl 2006).  However, these structures of 
governance are likely to function very differently in developing and transitional 
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countries like South Africa, which often lack legal-rational bureaucracies and 
well functioning markets.  
Indeed states and politics in Africa are very different to those in Western 
Europe (Bayart 1993; Castells 2000; Chabal and Daloz 1999). In the latter ‘the 
Hobbesian notion of the state led to the progressive development of relatively 
autonomous centres of power, invested with sole political legitimacy’ (Chabal 
and Daloz 1999:16). To a great extent states in Western Europe are organised 
through legal-rational bureaucracy; that is, based on the separation of the public 
and private spheres (Weber (1978 [1968]).  
In Africa, however, externally imposed colonial rule laid the foundations for a 
different kind of state. The legal-rational sphere was confined to the cities, the 
immigrant population and small sections of the colonized population. The vast 
majority of the population was ruled indirectly. The legacy of this mixture of 
patrimonial and legal-rational domination is apparent today and the state in 
Africa remains ‘firmly embedded in the patrimonial practices of patrons and 
their networks’ (Chabal and Daloz 1999:16). The result is hybrid 
‘neopatrimonial’ regimes, in which the ‘customs and patterns or patrimonialism 
co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions’ (Bratton and van de Walle 
1997:62). Thus, while formal structures and rules exist, in practice, the 
separation of the private and public sphere is not always observed due to a 
coexistence of clientalist networks.  
While the intensity and extensity of the legal-rational sphere was greater in 
South Africa than most of Africa, Mamdani (1996) has shown how the mode of 
colonial administration in South Africa was similar to elsewhere in the 
continent. The fact that the state in African is quite different to the state in the 
Western European context indicates that theoretical insights from the latter 
sphere should not be unquestionably transferred to the former. This may 
potentially have an enormous impact on the manner in which goods and 
services are delivered. 
29 
 
Also, the use of markets as governance structures is likely to function best in 
‘the shadow of the hierarchy’ (Heritier and Lehmkuhl 2008:2). The shadow of 
hierarchy can involve legislative sanctions or incentives.  This might, for 
example, mean the legislator or the regulator of a particular sector can threaten 
to enact adverse sanctions unless the potentially affected actors change their 
behavior to accommodate the legislators or the regulator’s demand (ibid).  
However, whether firms choose to comply with the demands depends on the 
likelihood that the legislator or regulator would actually implement the threat.  
However, this shadow might be weak in certain sectors or areas in South 
Africa. Hence, Risse and Lehmkuhl (2006) talk about governance in ‘areas of 
limited statehood’ in which the state lacks the capacity to implement and 
enforce central decisions. Hence, ‘the shadow of the hierarchy’ may be seen as 
an assumption built into the western notion of governance. However, since this 
is not present in all sectors or areas of South Africa, the forms of governance 
that occurs may look very different and often be a mixture of markets, networks 
and hierarchies as well as patrimonial relationships.  
2.3.2 Telecommunication reform and universal access in 
developing countries 
In the late 1980s the telecommunication policy in many developing countries 
entered into an era of neoliberal reform. In 1998, the liberalization agreement 
of the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) group on basic telecommunications 
was launched and it committed its signatories to liberalizing basic 
telecommunications. By early 1999, 80 of the 132 WTO members had signed, 
including South Africa.  The goals and process of reform differs among the 
various countries, but the trend is clear. There was a movement away from 
telecommunication sectors consisting of state-owned monopolies towards a 
privatized and at least partially competitive industry, often monitored by an 
independent regulator (Noll 2000:183). 
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In the context of an increasingly liberalizing telecommunication sector, many 
countries adopted universal service and access measures to ensure that areas 
and parts of the population that were deemed unprofitable by the private 
companies that increasingly dominated the sector would be able to avail of 
ICTs. An overview over the most common universal service and access 
measures is discussed in the ICT Regulation Toolkit developed by the UN 
agency ITU and the World Bank agency Infodev (Dymond et al. 2008). The 
toolkit draws on experience from developed countries, but it is important for 
understanding the intentions behind the approaches and policies taken in 
developing and transitional countries like South Africa.  
The first strategy is Universal Service Obligations (USOs). These are 
obligations given to public or private operators to make them roll out services 
to commercially unviable areas. Before liberalization, when the 
communications sectors were usually dominated by a state-owned monopolistic 
network, the USOs were seen as part of the organization’s general public 
service mandate. The operators were not run as capitalist enterprises, financial 
losses were rarely recognised and, if they were, it was expected they would be 
met by internal cross-subsidies. No unfairness was perceived because social 
obligations were in society’s interest and the organization’s customers, who 
ultimately bore most of the cost, represented most of society (ibid).  
Under the threat of liberalization, many incumbent operators tried to use their 
social roles to help secure preferable arrangements with the new regime. If they 
lost the fight against liberalization, incumbents often argued in favour of access 
deficit charges or shared funding of USOs. This was often more to burden their 
new competitors than to gain direct benefits for themselves. In most countries, 
the obligations on the national company were preserved and made explicit for 
the first time. There was little debate about the content of the obligations, and 
none about who should bear them, as the incumbent was seen as the only 
candidate. These obligations were often just a statement of existing practice.  In 
a liberalizing market, imposing USOs on the incumbent operator alone is 
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contrary to the objective of competition on equal terms. While some countries 
have used administrative USOs even after liberalisation, the trend is towards 
more competitive procedures. Often, there is a move away from forced 
obligations towards a regime where the cost of universal access and service 
(UAS) provision is shared proportionally among all industry participants and 
all players have an opportunity to participate, often through a competitive 
mechanism, in the provision of UAS (ibid).  
A second strategy often employed to reach Universal Service and Access goals 
were Universal Service and Access Funds (UASFs). These funds have often 
been created in developing countries in the context of liberalized markets, to 
provide financial assistance for the following: 
- Meeting regional and rural service targets for telephony and Internet services; 
- Supporting key users, such as schools and health clinics to access the Internet in 
regional and rural areas;  
- Supporting ICT projects by commercial and development organizations that provide 
national and local content, services and applications that stimulate Internet take-up 
and usage; and 
- Supporting various activities related to regionally balanced network and service 
development, such as Internet Exchange Points and regional Internet points of 
presence (POPs) (ibid:3.2).  
 
UASFs tend to use a minimum-subsidy auction mechanism, which means that 
the lowest subsidy demanded wins. This mechanism was designed as a strategy 
to use performance-based subsidies to support service delivery in cases where 
the market is not expected to reach, but where policy concerns justify public 
funding or redistribution. Such subsidies support the provision of services in 
rural and disadvantaged areas where the cost of service provision combined 
with limited revenue potential might render service provision unprofitable. 
A final strategy is the telecentres. The idea of a telecentre arose in Scandinavia 
in the 1980s and has since spread to many developing countries (ibid:3.3.3). A 
telecentre is a place where the public can access and use ICTs. The most 
common definition of a telecentre refers to a place where the public can access 
computer and internet services. Telecentres have in many countries become 
part of universal access and service programmes. Telecentres can be run as a 
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small business such as a cyber café with some non-commercial features, or they 
can be run primarily for community benefit as non–profit or locally subsidized 
facilities. In the latter case they are usually known as community telecentres or 
multi-purpose community telecentres (ibid). 
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3.Research design and Methodology 
The prime objective of this chapter is to describe the research design and 
methodology used in this thesis and to assess the overall soundness of the 
project.  
3.1 Research Design and operationalisation 
The research question of this thesis is ‘to what extent and why has South 
Africa’s ICT to the poor policy been successful?’  
The design chosen is a case study of South Africa’s ICT to the poor policy. A 
case study has advantages over other research designs when the objective of the 
study is to capture a contemporary phenomenon in its real life context and 
when how and why questions are asked (Yin 2003:1). This case study consists 
of multiple sub-units of analysis, or cases within the case, since the ICT to the 
poor policy has multiple objectives, channels and outputs on the ground. As a 
result the thesis combines both a single and a comparative case method. The 
overall design is a single case study of the ICT to the poor policy, but since this 
is made up of three implementation channels, the case has three sub-units of 
analysis within the case that can be compared. 
The sub-questions in the introduction and the conceptual model set out in the 
theory chapter constitute the analytical framework for this thesis. The central 
aim of this thesis is to see how the policy intentions and implementation 
channels chosen in the design of the ICT to the poor policy affects the results of 
the policy on the ground in the South African context. The independent 
variables in this thesis are the policy intentions and the implementation 
channels adopted to achieve the intentions, while the results of the policy on the 
ground are the dependent variable. 
34 
 
The first independent variable is the policy intentions of the ICT to the poor 
policy. In South Africa, the ICT to the poor policy consists of several acts and 
policy documents passed and issued by the government. These documents were 
analysed in order to understand the key objectives, tools and structures of the 
ICT to the poor policy.  
The second independent variable is the implementation channels. A 
fundamental assumption in this thesis is that the process and results can be 
altered by changing the organisational structures of a programme and hence 
that these organisational structures are central in explaining the results on the 
ground. It further assumes that the formal organisational structure channels 
action in a particular way (Christensen et al. 2007:152). The analysis of 
government acts and policy documents relating to ICT to the poor policy 
allowed me to identify the multiple intentions, tools and structures of the 
policy. On the basis of these, three implementation channels were 
operationalised. These were i) the telecentre channel which aimed at providing 
telecentres in poor communities, ii) the market channel which aimed at 
providing voice telephony to households and internet to schools and iii) the 
education channel which aimed at providing computers and train teachers in 
schools.  An implementation channel refers to the tools and structures created 
in the policy design to carry out the policy intentions and the implementation 
process and results this resulted in.  
The timeframe of my analysis is of the policy implementation process of the 
ICT to the poor policy is from the adoption of the policy in 1996 and 2008 
when the fieldwork was conducted. My analysis also takes place across levels 
from the results in three poor communities, through local and provincial 
structures to the national implementing and policy-making actors in the capital 
Pretoria. Hence, both the time and the level dimension must be factored into the 
analysis. The approach taken in this thesis is largely an instrumental one. 
However, it does acknowledge and is open to the way that the specific South 
African and policy context affects the implementation process and results.  
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The dependent variable in the thesis is the policy results on the ground in poor 
communities. When discussing results of a policy it is common to distinguish 
between outputs and outcomes (Hill and Hupe 2009:9). Outputs refer to 
whether the specified activities are established on the ground, whereas 
outcomes refer to whether they have any effect on the problem. In many 
implementation studies, goal achievement has been a normal evaluation 
standard and this implies a focus on outcomes (ibid). Since this thesis 
concentrates on the relationships between the implementation process and 
structures and the results, the focus must be on explaining the outputs on the 
ground because it is essentially outputs that can be explained by the policy 
process (Winter 2003).  
Moreover the results or the effects of a policy can be measured narrowly or 
broadly (Christensen et al. 2007:153). This thesis uses a narrow definition of an 
effect or a result and focuses on to what extent the central intentions of the 
policy have been achieved. Hence performance indicators will be developed on 
the basis of the central intentions of the three channels. No appropriate statistics 
on the performance of the three channels in poor communities are available in 
South Africa and a large statistical survey is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Hence, the results of the policy will be investigated on the ground in three poor 
communities in South Africa. The channels had all been poorly evaluated by 
the implementing agents, but the available reports were collected during 
fieldwork. These, interviews with informants and fieldwork observations will 
also be used to describe the outputs of the three channels.  
Outcomes, as opposed to outputs, refer to the extent that policy has impacted 
on the problem it is attempting to resolve. In the case of the ICT to the poor 
policy, the problem was low level of usage of ICTs in poor communities. A 
successful outcome would be the increased use of ICT in the poor 
communities. Therefore, I will try to look at usage levels in the three poor 
communities.  People may have used ICTs in other places than the ones 
developed by the government, which would not be a direct result of the policy. 
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However, when measured at the local level and seen in relation to the outputs 
and performance indicators in the same communities, outcomes are likely to 
give valuable information on to what extent the output of the policy has 
impacted on the problem of low levels of ICT usage in the three poor 
communities. Hence, the outcome variables that will be considered it presented 
in table 1.  
Table 1: Usage indicators for computers and the internet 
 Usage in the three communities 
1. % of people in the three case communities that had used a 
computer 
2. % of people in the three case communities that had used a 
computer within the last 6 months 
3. % of people that had used the internet in the last 6 months 
 
The overall question asked in this thesis is a why question and the central 
rationale of this thesis is to explain the results of the policy on the ground. 
However, in order to do this, the policy intentions, the implementation 
structures and the outputs on the ground must be described and the process 
leading from the intentions to the results on the ground must be explored. 
Consequently this case study must first explore and describe in order to be able 
to explain. The aim of this thesis is not to come up with definitive answers, but 
rather to suggest tentative but empirically-based explanations related to how the 
pro-poor tools and structures of the South African telecommunication policy 




3.2 Number and location of research sites 
The ICT to the poor policy targets previously disadvantaged or poor 
communities. However, an investigation of the outputs of the three channels in 
each poor community in South Africa is way beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Instead I chose a smaller selection of communities that were as representative 
as possible for communities in which poor people live in South Africa. All of 
the communities are located in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. This is for 
several reasons. KwaZulu-Natal is home to 21% of South Africa’s poor and is 
has the second highest proportion of the poor in South Africa after Eastern 
Cape (Leibrandt and Woolard 1999:45). KwaZulu-Natal is also the province in 
which I have best access to poor and previously disadvantaged communities 
because I have knowledge and contacts in the province after two previous study 
periods at the University of KwaZulu-Natal.  
Through my supervisor I had access to a project in which he was the principal 
researcher. This was of great help during fieldwork. The full title of the project 
is: Community-based Learning, ICTs and Quality-of-life (CLIQ):  A 
Participatory Approach to Assessing the Impact of ICT Access on Quality-of-
life in KwaZulu-Natal. The thesis thus became a part of the CLIQ, which was a 
three year research project conducted as a joint venture between a South 
African research theme on School of Development Studies and a Norwegian 
Research team from Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research and 
funded by the National Research Foundation (South Africa) and Research 
Council of Norway.  
The project was conducting research on the impact of ICT on quality of life in 
four poor communities in KwaZulu-Natal: two urban and two rural. I chose to 
locate this study in three of these four communities. The communities were 
chosen in cooperation with researchers on the CLIQ project who had good local 
knowledge on what constitutes a representative poor community in South 
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Africa.  Hence, communities were chosen based on the following selection 
criteria to ensure unbiased results.  
Firstly, the policy targets previously disadvantaged urban and rural areas 
communities and hence the communities chosen needed to be as representative 
as possible for such previously disadvantaged communities.  Previously 
disadvantaged communities are the communities located in the areas to which 
the apartheid regime restricted the black majority under apartheid. The 
province of KwaZulu-Natal had two black, rural homeland areas under 
apartheid and several black townships on the fringes of the city of Durban. The 
CLIQ project had chosen to study two communities in a former homeland in 
the deep rural areas and two urban communities on the fringes of the city of 
Durban.  
Secondly, the communities chosen needed to have all the three implementation 
channels present in terms schools, households and telecentres. Since all 
communities have schools and households, the selection criteria were whether 
they had an operating telecentre. The CLIQ project had, through discussions 
with USAASA, located the poor communities in the province with the best 
working telecentres as they were investigating the impact of ICT on quality of 
life. Hence, these communities becomes ‘least likely cases’ meaning that if the 
policy had failed to provide access in these communities, it is likely to have 
failed in other communities as well. 
A final important consideration for selecting the communities was that I needed 
to have access and introduction to the communities. The high level of crime 
and the lack of street signs in many disadvantaged areas in South Africa, 
combined with the history of racism, make it risky for a young, white woman to 
travel in to such areas alone without knowing anyone. Having contacts to the 
communities through the CLIQ project was crucial to enable me to safely and 
effectively conduct research in these areas. 
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Based on these criteria, three previously disadvantaged communities in 
KwaZulu-Natal were chosen. Inanda is an urban community located in a black 
township to the North of Durban, Adams Mission is a peri-urban community 
located to the South of Durban, and Sicabazini is a remote rural community 
located in north KwaZulu-Natal on the boarder to Mozambique in the former 
homeland Zululand. However, because the telecentre in Inkhlazuka was not 
operating at the time of my fieldwork, I chose to leave this out of my fieldwork. 
The location of the KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa is shown on the map in 
figure 2 and the location of the communities in the province are shown on the 
map in figure 3. 
 
Figure 2: Map of South Africa with study area of KwaZulu-Natal marked.  










3.3 Selecting informants and institutions 
The ICT to the poor policy aimed to provide ICTs to schools, telecentres and 
households in the disadvantaged areas. The starting point of my fieldwork was 
schools and telecentres in the three case communities. Access in households 
was covered in the CLIQ survey discussed below. I conducted observations and 
interviews in the telecentres and from there I visited the surrounding schools. 
One telecentre and between two and four schools were visited in each location. 
Between two and five days were spent in each of the three poor communities. 
The sample of schools and telecentres in the different communities is shown in 
table 2.   








Telecentres 1 1 1 3 
Schools 2 4 4 10 
 
At the local level, interviews were conducted with 1-3 telecentre managers or 
staff in each telecentre and 1-2 teachers in each school, preferably the principal 
or the teacher teaching the subject ‘Computer Application Technology’. The 
interviews were combined with observations in the cyber labs and telecentres. 
Although, a more thorough investigation of the situation in schools would have 
been useful, the teachers were very busy and I felt that it would have been 
wrong to take up more time than absolutely necessary.  
From the teachers and the telecentre managers, a method of snowballing were 
used in order to get in touch with new informants involved in the 
implementation on the ground and at the higher levels in the three channels. 
Through these interviews I was able to gain an understanding of the 
implementation structure at the local, provincial and national level as well as 
explore the implementation process. 20 interviews were conducted with 
bureaucrats and others involved in the implementation.  
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Altogether, 45 qualitative interviews with people involved in the three 
implementation channels at the local, intermediate and national level were 
carried out. A list of the informant’s title, organisation and date is presented in 
subchapter 9.3 in the reference chapter.   Table 3 shows the distribution of 
informants on the local, intermediate and national level in the three channels. 








National 0 2 2 2 6 
Intermediate 5 3 0 6 14 
Local 11 9 2 3 25 
Total 14 14 2 13 45 
 
As seen in table 3, more interviews were conducted with people in the 
educational and telecentre channel than in the market channel. No one was 
interviewed at the local and intermediate level in the market channel because 
information on access in the household could be obtained in from the CLIQ 
survey and the market channel had no local structure beyond the 
telecommunication companies. Interviews with these might have given fruitful 
information, but I did not have the time to do this during fieldwork. Instead, I 
chose to rely on secondary material to add to the interviews on the national 
level. Most important in this respect were Hodge (2003), Makhaya and Roberts 
(2003), Benjamin (2001) and Esselaar and Gillwald (2007).  No one was 
interviewed at the national in the educational channel, but this was not a 
problem since the implementation structure in the educational channel was 
provincial. Further, the interviews in each channel also gave useful information 
about implementation in the market channels and vice versa, and the provincial 
actors gave useful information about the local and national level. 
42 
 
3.4 Data  
The rationale of this thesis requires the collection and analysis of different 
types of data and to some extent a triangulation between different types of data. 
The data collection process therefore combined a review of relevant policy 
documents and reports, qualitative interviewing and the use of existing and 
available statistics. To describe the intentions of the policy, a review of policy 
documents were conducted before entering the field. After reviewing the 
central policy documents, a fieldwork was planned and conducted from 
October to December 2008. Of a total of eight weeks in South Africa, seven 
were spent in the KwaZulu-Natal and one in the capital Pretoria. During 
fieldwork, the implementation channels were explored through observation and 
qualitative interviewing in starting with the results in telecentres, schools and 
households and exploring the local, provincial and national implementation 
structures in a bottom-up manner ending up in Pretoria where the key intentions 
of the national policy makers were elaborated on further.  
3.4.1 Primary sources 
Policy documents 
In order to understand the policy intentions of the ICT to the poor policy a 
review of relevant policy documents were conducted, but the intentions were 
also explored in the interviews during fieldwork. Most documents were found 
on the internet pages of the South African Government, the Department of 
Communications (DoC) and the Department of Education (DoE) as well as on 
the implementing agents ICASA and USAASA’s webpages, but some where 
also collected during fieldwork. To ensure that I had collected all the relevant 
policy documents, phone calls were made to the head of the policy unit in the 
DoC, the Presidential National Commission on Information Society and 
Development (PNC on ISAD) and the Department of Education. The review 
was more challenging than I envisaged because the policy framework was 
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fragmented and had changed several times in the post-apartheid era. However, 
the review found that the central intentions of their ICT to the poor policy were 
stated in the following documents:  
*  The White Paper on Telecommunications (1996) 
* The Telecommunications Act (1996) 
* The Universal Access and Universal Service Discussion Paper (1999) 
* The Telecommunications Amendment Act (2001)  
* Policy Directions (2001) 
* The White Paper on E-education (2004) 
* The Provincial Department of Education’s Strategy on ICT 
* Electronic Communications Act (2005) 
* The Universal Access and Universal Service Discussion Document (2008) 
 
The legislation in the communications sector had been reformed three times in 
the post-apartheid era. The first legislative reform was in 1996 with the launch 
of the first White Paper on E-education and the Telecommunications Act of 
1996. The second legislative reform was in 2001, with the adoption of new 
policy directions and an Amendment Act.  In 2005 these were replaced by the 
Electronic Communications Act. However, the key intentions, actors and tools 
in the ICT to the poor policy remained the same under this new legislation. 
Despite several efforts, these acts were never specified into national or 
provincial strategies with clear targets and timeframes.  In addition to these acts 
in the communications sector, I found the White Paper on E-education (2004) 
and the provincial strategy of education to be important documents adding to 
the above. The documents above where analysed in the sense that the central 
ICT to the poor policy intentions and tools were identified.  
Interviews 
The other important data collection method utilised in this thesis was 
interviewing. Three interview guides were developed to three groups of 
people.1 One guide was made for the telecentre managers, one for the teachers 
and one for the bureaucrats involved in the implementation process on various 
                                            
1 The interview guides are presented in Appendix 1. 
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levels. All the interviews were semi structured, but a method of probing to get 
depth and detail was used in the interviews with bureaucrats.  
The interviews with the telecentre managers and teachers in schools where 
characterized by specific questions about the results of the policy in  order to 
establish to what extent the policy results of the channels had been successful 
on the ground  and to find out who was involved in implementing the policy on 
the ground. 
The interviews with the bureaucrats involved in the implementation process 
semi structured in-depth interviews were conducted.  A general interview guide 
was developed, but it certain questions were modified depending on the agency 
the organisation represented. All the informants were asked about the 
intentions, structure, process and results of the respective channel they were 
involved in. In addition, the bureaucrats were mildly ‘confronted’ with the 
results I had found on the ground in the three poor communities and asked for 
explanations. In this latter part of the interview all the informants were asked 
about the results and the explanations from all the channels on the ground.   
Broadly speaking the central topics explored in the in-depth interviews with the 
provincial and national bureaucrats were therefore:  
* Intentions for the different channels 
* Implementation structure of the different channels Implementation 
process of the different channels 
* Results of the policy  
* Confrontation with the results on the ground and quest for explanations.  
 
All the interviews conducted at the intermediate and national level were 
recorded and the notes from the interviews at the local level were written out 
shortly after the interview. Also, a field diary was kept. These documents can 
be provided if requested.  
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3.4.2 Secondary sources 
To get information about household access and usage of ICT in the case 
communities, I used a survey conducted by the CLIQ project in June and July 
2008 in four poor communities. Three of these where the case communities that 
I investigated and hence it was these results that I used. The survey was the 
only available data on access and usage to ICT in the three communities and 
gave valuable information. However, it has certain limitations. Firstly, the 
sample was relatively small with only 236 respondents. Hence, there is a risk 
that the results do not give an accurate picture of what is occurring in the 
communities. Secondly, the survey is not based on randomized selection of 
respondents. Instead, the questionnaire was conducted on the basis of self-
recruitment. A poster was put up outside the telecentre and the interested 
respondents showed up at a certain time to be interviewed. This might have 
lead to an unrepresentative sample and create biased results. There might be an 
overrepresentation of people living near the telecentre and actually using the 
telecentre in the sample. Hence, the respondent in the CLIQ survey might show 
a higher level of ICT access and usage than in other parts of the same 
community or in other, similar communities. Consequently the data must be 
understood in the context of its deficiencies. Table 4 shows the distribution of 
representatives on the communities.   
Table 4: Respondents to the CLIQ survey 
 Sicabazini Adams Mission Inanda (Inkhlazuka) Total 
Number of 
respondents 







4. ICT to the poor policy intentions 
This and the following three chapters constitute the empirical part of the thesis. 
Each of the chapters answers one of the sub-questions posed in the 
introduction, which are related to the conceptual framework presented in the 
theory chapter. This chapter aims to answer sub-question I: What are the policy 
intentions? Chapter 5 addresses sub-question II:  What are the implementation 
structures and processes in place to carry out the intentions? Chapter 6 answers 
sub-question III: What are the results on the ground? And chapter 7 attempts to 
answer sub-question IV: What can explain the results? 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the post-apartheid ICT to the poor policy. 
To this end there three sections. The first section sets out the broader context in 
which South Africa’s ICT to the poor policy was adopted. Section two analyses 
the policy intentions of the post-apartheid telecommunications policy and how 
the ICT to the poor policy fits into this. Section three considers the more 
specific intentions and tools adopted of the pro-poor parts of the policy.  
4.1 Background 
Throughout the apartheid era the ANC had espoused a socialist ideology. The 
Freedom Charter (ANC 1955) – the manifesto of the broad anti-apartheid 
alliance during the struggle against apartheid – advocated the nationalization 
and redistribution of land and wealth, as well as the provision of free basic 
services. References to the Freedom Charter and its values were present in the 
RDP programme, which was adopted as the election manifesto of the Tripartite 
Alliance prior to the first election. The RDP was a broad development 
programme that argued for a balance between the state and the market and gave 
the meeting of basic needs the first priority (Terreblanche 2003:89; Visser 
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2004:7). A significantly modified version of the RDP election manifesto 
became the first socioeconomic policy framework in the new South Africa.  
The ANC government encountered many problems when they attempted to put 
the RDP into practice. Some observers have argued that the RDP was broadly 
formulated and resembled an unrealistic wish list to please everyone (Visser 
2004:7). Moreover, it is suggested that the government lacked a specific 
implementation plan to realise its goals and did not have the implementation 
skills to put their plans into practice. Bond (2000:90, 97-98) argues that the 
RDP was ‘fatally undermined by timid politicians, hostile bureaucrats and 
unreliable private sector partners’. It is clear, furthermore, that South Africa’s 
economic and fiscal challenges hindered the realisation of the RDP goals. 
While the government aimed at economic growth of 4-6%, the actual growth 
rate was only 2.5% (ibid). In the absence of marked economic growth the 
government did not have the resources to fund the ambitious goals of the RDP.  
International financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, 
heavily lobbied the new ANC government to adopt a neoliberal 
macroeconomic policy (Marais 2001; Bond 2000). After the currency crisis in 
February 1996, when the value of the rand fell by 25%, the government closed 
down the RDP office and adopted the neoliberal macroeconomic policy 
framework called the Growth Employment and Redistribution Programme 
(GEAR) (ibid). GEAR changed the leitmotif of government policy from 
redistribution to growth. Thus, as economic concerns increasingly dominated 
government policy, the social goals of the RDP were subordinated to the desire 
for rapid economic growth (Visser 2004:8). The essence of the GEAR was to 
reduce the role of the state and focus the reduced state budget on meeting the 
basic needs of the poor, while allowing the market and the private sector to take 
the leading role in the development of the country. Visser summarized the 
GEAR as follows:  
economic development in South Africa should be led by the private sector; 
the state should play a smaller role in the economy; state-owned assets should 
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be privatized; there should be deep cuts in government spending; 
international competitiveness and an export orientated economy should be 
encouraged; of exchange controls should be relaxed; and social service 
delivery budgets and municipal infrastructure programmes should be 
reprioritized in order to address the claims of the poor to a fair package to 
meet their basic needs’ (ibid:9). 
 
A central intention of the GEAR was that, at the same time as their budgets 
were reduced, the departments were required to extend services to the 
previously disadvantaged and under-served areas. To achieve this, the 
government had to move out of service delivery that could be more effectively 
delivered by the private sector. It had to establish public–private partnerships to 
increase efficiency and improve access to capital and new technologies and it 
had to raise funds from privatisation should be used to reduce the budget 
(Mokate 2000:63).  
On the one hand the GEAR reduced the role of the state in service delivery, and 
on the other it increased the privatization of state companies and outsourcing of 
service delivery functions to private companies, NGOs and communities in 
order to cut costs. In some instances big companies with a large amount of 
capital were brought in, while in others contracts went to local black economic 
empowerment initiatives. In yet others, the service was outsourced to 
communities who were expected to manage a library or a park on volunteer 
labour with severely reduced budget allocations (Pape and McDonald 2002:6). 
The end result was that ‘Literally - hundreds of services previously provided by 
provincial and local municipalities were handed over to private providers - 
from the bus service in Durban, to the storm water drains in Middleburg to the 
motor-vehicle registration in the Northern Cape, to street sweeping in Cape 
Town’ (ibid:6).  
Thus, it is apparent that the transition to GEAR significantly changed the 
emphasis of South African macroeconomic policy from redistribution to 
growth, from state to market, from democratic to technocratic politics and from 




In contrast to the RDP programme, which was developed through negotiations 
with the South African Communist Part (SACP) and the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU), the GEAR was developed by a task team of 
technocrats. This had created considerable disagreements within the tripartite 
alliance because it went along way in arguing for privatisation and 
liberalisation to which the SACP and COSATU were vehemently opposed. As 
a result, while the underlying economic and political principles of policies and 
acts were informed by the neoliberal principles of the GEAR, they often 
continued to include the goals and the populist rhetoric of the RDP, (Pape and 
McDonald 2002). This inherent ambiguity is a clear in the development of the 
post-apartheid telecommunications policy, of which the ICT to the poor policy 
was a part.  
4.2 The politics of ICT to the poor policy intentions 
Broadly speaking, the ICT to the poor policy has been a part of four policy 
reforms. The first was in 1996 when the government adopted the White Paper 
on Telecommunications (1996) and the Telecommunications Act (1996). The 
second was in 2001, when this was amended by the Telecommunications 
Amendment Act (2001) and its policy directions. The third was in 2004 when 
the launching of the White Paper on E-education (2004) was adopted. The 
fourth was in 2005 with the adoption of the Electronic Communications Act 
(2005).  
In 1996, South Africa adopted the first White Paper on Telecommunications 
(1996) and Telecommunications Act (1996) in the post-apartheid era. These 
two documents became the first legislative telecommunications reform in South 
Africa. The vision of the White Paper reiterated the goal of the RDP 
programme to achieve universal access to telecommunications services (see 
chapter 1). But the new vision it presented reflected the transition from RDP to 
the GEAR and emphasized a wish to balance the provision of telephone 
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services to poor households in previously disadvantaged areas with those of the 
growing economy and the private sector: 
The state’s vision for telecommunications is one that balances the provision 
of basic universal service to disadvantaged rural and urban communities 
with the delivery of high-level services capable of meeting the needs of a 
growing South African economy (Ministry of Post, Telecommunications 
and Broadcasting 1996:17.1.1). 
 
The state recognizes the central importance of access to 
telecommunications to the achievement of its social and economic goals. 
Affordable communications for all, citizens and business alike, throughout 
South Africa is at the core of its vision and the goal of this policy 
(ibid:17.1.2). 
 
Like in many other developing countries at the time, the central intention of the 
telecommunications policy in South Africa was the gradual liberalisation of the 
telecommunications sector and a part-privatization of the state-owned 
telecommunications company, Telkom. Telkom was given 5 years of monopoly 
up to 2001. The intention was to give Telkom time to extend the fixed line 
network and prepare for competition through the rebalancing of its tariffs. After 
that, the market would be gradually liberalised and competition introduced in a 
phased manner in the various segments of the market until full liberalisation 
was achieved.   
The Telecommunications Act (1996) decided to partly privatise Telkom by 
selling of 30% of its equity to private business. The Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU), that had represented the Tripartite Alliance2 in the 
negotiations with the apartheid regime on the telecommunications issue during 
the transition, had opposed the privatization of state-owned enterprises because 
of its perceived negative effects on the socio-economic interests of the poor and 
the working class. The alliance feared that if a profit-motivated private 
company owned a large proportion of Telkom the goal of universal access 
would be undermined (Benjamin 2001:97).  However, the logic of the newly 
                                            
2 The Tripartite Alliance was an alliance between the ANC, the South African Communist Party 
(SACP) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). 
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adopted GEAR policy framework saw privatisation as necessary in order to 
attract investment and skills, which were needed to achieve the development 
goals of the RDP without increasing public spending and raising tax levels. 
With the large debt that Telkom had developed throughout the 1980s, further 
borrowing was not a realistic proposition (ibid). Hence, the ANC agreed to the 
privatisation of Telkom and in 1997 30% of Telkom's shares were sold to 
SABC and Telkom Malaysia (Benjamin 2001:93). Since then further shares 
have been sold off and in 2010 the government retained a 39.8% stake in 
Telkom (Telkom official website 2010). 
The central strategy of the telecommunication policy as sketched out above was 
to gradually liberalise the market and attract foreign investments through a 
privatisation of state assets. The White Paper did, nevertheless, acknowledge 
that market processes alone were insufficient to address the needs of the poor in 
previously disadvantaged areas because these were unprofitable:  
The apartheid system left the vast majority of black South Africans, 
particularly in rural communities, without access to basic communications 
services. Liberalisation trends associated with the spread of the global 
information highway and the legitimate needs of South African business 
and urban areas for advanced services could easily combine to draw interest 
and resources away from the delivery of service to rural and disadvantaged 
areas (Ministry of Post, Telecommunications and Broadcasting 1996: 18, 
1.13).  
 
The policy explicitly recognized the particulars of South African circumstances 
and proposed targeted measures to enhance access among the poor and 
previously disadvantaged in the context of liberalisation: 
While universal service is a global concern, it is located within a unique 
context in South Africa. Nowhere else does such disparity of access exist 
side by side with a developed communications technology sector. Nowhere 
else are both access and ownership concentrated so heavily in one 
population group. These imbalances, which are the legacy of apartheid, 
must be urgently redressed. Members of historically disadvantaged 
communities, and particularly those in rural areas, must be the immediate 




The overall goal of the South African Telecommunications policy was 
Universal Service for all.  However, the choice of strategy was influenced by 
the ANC’s transition to GEAR, which resulted in a strategy of market 
liberalisation and privatisation to attract foreign direct investments. While the 
market catered for the wealthier part of the population, it was proposed that the 
newly emaciated state would concentrate on and channel its limited budgets 
towards providing access in previously disadvantaged communities. This was 
to ensure that the poor and unprofitable groups would not be left out in a 
liberalized environment.  Hence, although the vision was access for all, the 
strategy chosen was liberalisation and privatisation combined with a targeted 
model of service delivery to the poor.  
 
4.3 The ICT to the poor policy intentions and tools 
The White Paper of Telecommunications (1996) and the Telecommunications 
Act (1996) had a strong focus on providing telecommunications services in 
poor households.3 The key tools adopted in the Telecommunications Act 
(1996) in order to achieve this objective was (i) Universal Service Obligations 
(USOs) placed on private operators and (ii) a Universal Service and Access 
Fund (USAF)4 dedicated to paying subsidies for the provision of 
telecommunications to ‘needy persons’ or ‘un-served areas’. The key 
implementing agents established were (i) an independent regulator called the 
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA),5 which was 
in charge of issuing licenses with USOs, and (ii) the Universal Service and 
                                            
3 Universal service refers to access in the household, while ’universal access’ refers to access to ICT on 
an institutional basis.  
4 The fund was originally called the Universal Service Fund (USF), but the name was changed to 
Universal Service and Access Fund (USAF) and this name will be used in this thesis to avoid 
confusion. 
5 The regulator was originally called South African Telecommunications Regulatory Authority 
(SATRA), but was later  renamed ICASA and ICASA will be used in this thesis to avoid confusion. 
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Access Agency of South Africa (USAASA),6 which was in charge of managing 
the USAF. These tools and structures will be discussed more thoroughly in the 
next chapter.  
 
The goals in the Telecommunications Act (1996) were broad and poorly 
defined. Hence, USAASA was forced to clarify definitions for terms such 
‘universal service and access’, ‘needy persons’ and an ‘un-served area’ to 
ensure that the sector was working towards the same goals. The first attempt 
was in 1999, USAASA released a discussion document defining ‘Universal 
Service and Access’ and setting specific targets. It suggested that the long-term 
goal of the sector should be that every household had access to fixed line 
services. However, no time frame was set for the achievement of this long-term 
goal. The intermediate goals proposed in the discussion document were: 
 
• Everyone should have a working phone accessible 24 hours a day within 1 
kilometre in rural areas and 200 metres in non rural areas by 2004 (USAASA 
1999:14). 
• There should be full cellular network coverage by all operators over the entire 
territory of South Africa by 2001 (ibid:11). 
•  Every community should have access to a telecentre type facility that gives 
access to facilities such as fax, photocopying, computers and the internet by 
2004 (ibid). 
 
However, according to my informants, this document was never adopted by the  
DoC . No new discussion document was launched by USAASA until 2008 and 
this stated that:  
There has been a general consensus in the country’s ICT industry that 
universal service in South Africa has been addressed in an uncoordinated 
manner. For example, there has never been a complete process to define 
universal service and access. Secondly, each telecommunication operator has 
a separate definition of an under-served area, as well as different roll out 
targets and community service obligations. Third, there is no formal 
definition of needy persons and no set criteria which can be used to disburse 
funds to serve these needy people. All these factors, as well as others not 
mentioned in this document make it difficult to assess if the objectives of the 
                                            
6 The agency was originally named the Universal Service Agency (USA), but the name was later 
changed to Universal Service and Access Agency of South Africa and this will be used here.  
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Telecommunications Act of 1996, especially those related to universal 
service and access, have been achieved (USAASA:2008d) 
In 2002, the Telecommunications Act (1996) was amended by the 
Telecommunications Amendment Act (2001) and its policy directions. The 
objectives of the policy directions remained the provision of universal service 
in households, but in addition it added a new goal of universal access to more 
advanced ICTs through institutions such as in telecentres and computer labs in 
schools in disadvantaged communities (Department of Communications 
2001:1).  
 
In order to achieve these, the provision of ICT to schools and telecentres was 
included in the mandate of the USAF, the provision of internet to schools was 
included in the USOs, and a new tool called the ‘E-rate’ was adopted which 
aimed to give all public schools a 50% E-rate discount on internet services. 
These tools will be discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter. In addition, 
the Telecommunications Amendment Act called on the Minister of 
Communications to ‘Develop the Information, Communication and Technology 
(ICT) strategy for information technology in the Republic, in order to bridge 
the digital divide’ (Republic of South Africa 2001:2s). 
 
However, despite the fact the 2001 Act called specifically on the minister of 
communications to develop a strategy to bridge the digital divide (ibid), this 
has not happened. A consultant who had many years of experience of the South 
African ICT industry expressed it this way: 
There is no overall national ICT policy for bridging the digital divide that 
defines roles and responsibilities and coordinates between the different actors 
involved. There has been an ongoing process to develop a national E-strategy 
for a long time. However, no policy has been drafted. This is because of the 
high level of conflict in the sector around issues such as which government 
department should be the main player, the role of the private players 
involved, bad planning and no overall vision from the government’s side. The 
result is that there is no coordination. There is no coordination between the 
various government actors on the national level, at the sector level and from 
the national actors down to the provincial and municipality level and between 
actors at the local level (Interview 25). 
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In 2005 the Electronic Communications Act was launched and replaced the 
legislative framework outlined above (Republic of South Africa 2005). It 
introduced a new licensing framework suited to technology convergence and 
aimed to create a fully liberalized market. However, the intentions, tools and 
institutions of the ICT to the poor policy remained the same and hence this act 
does not represent a fundamental shift in the ICT to the poor policy. It will not 
therefore be central to my analysis.  
In sharp contrast to the lack of clear objectives and timeframes in the 
communications sector, the national  DoE had launched a White Paper on E-
education in 2004.  This had as its overall goal of making every teacher and 
pupil ICT-literate by 2013 (Department of Education 2004). It also included an 
implementation strategy with clear targets. It stated that by 2007 50% of the 
schools should have access to a networked computer facility for teaching and 
learning (Department of Education 2004:40). While the national White Paper is 
a guiding policy, it has to be specified and implemented at the provincial level. 
The provincial Department of Education (PDoE) developed a provincial 
strategy in the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Education.  This document 
specified three priority areas for the delivery of ICT: first, to deliver one 
computer for administrative purposes to all schools; second, to deliver 
computer labs to schools; and third, to train teachers in ICT (Interview 28).  
In summary, the broad intentions of the ICT to the poor policy seem to have 
been to provide basic telecommunications services to households, and more 
advanced ICTs to schools and telecentres in poor communities. These 
intentions have, in spite of repeated calls, never been specified into a coherent 
national strategy to bridge the digital divide. According to my informants there 
have been attempts to develop such a strategy for a long time, but these have 
floundered due to conflict in the sector. The result was that the communications 
sector was without clearly specified goals for the entire implementation period 
between 1997 and 2008. The exception is the White Paper on E-education and 
the specification and implementation of this at the provincial level.  
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The central intentions of the ICT to the poor policy and the tools and structures 
adopted to achieve these intentions are summarized in table 5.  
Table 5: Intentions, tools and state implementing organisations of the ICT to the 
poor policy 
Documents Intention Tools Implementing 
Organisations 





‘Universal service’7. Defined 





Obligations (USOs) and 
Universal Service and 
Access Fund (USF) 
Independent regulator and 




(2001) and Policy 
Directions (2001) 
‘Universal access’. Defined 
as access to computers and 
internet in schools and 
telecentres 
 




Unchanged Unchanged Unchanged 
White Paper on E-
education 
Every teacher and pupil to be 
E-literate by 2011 
USOs and direct delivery 




South Africa  (ICASA) 






Provide computers and 
computer labs to schools and 
train teachers 
Direct delivery by 
Provincial Department of 
Education. 
Provincial Department of 
Education 
 
These policy intentions led to a complex implementation structure consisting of 
three implementation channels: the telecentre channel, the market channel and 
the education channel. The next chapter will more thoroughly describe the tools 
and structures adopted in the ICT to the poor policy and the resulting process. 




5. The implementation of the ‘ICT to the poor’ 
policy  
This chapter answers sub-question II set out in the introduction: How is the 
policy implemented?   
A key focus of the 1996 Telecommunications Act and its amendment in 2001 
was the provision of ICT access to the poor in previously disadvantaged areas. 
These policy documents set out a policy design, which specified several tools 
with different delivery structures that were to be adopted in order to achieve the 
policy objective. These tools and structures frame the implementation process 
in terms of the activities and the behaviour that follows the adoption of the 
policy design.  
The chapter will first set out the general implementation structure for the pro-
poor policy intentions which consists of three implementation channels with 
different tools, structures and processes. Thereafter, it will discuss the tools and 
structures chosen and the resultant implementation process for each 
implementation channel. The final part of this chapter will discuss the structural 
characteristics of each channel.  
Christensen et al. (2007:37) distinguish between simple and complex 
organisational structures. A simple structure consists of few positions and 
subunits related in a straightforward way. A complex structure, on the other 
hand, has many levels, many units and many horizontal and vertical links. 
Figure 4 attempts to convey the complexity of the ICT to the poor policy 
implementation structure in visual form. It is apparent that the implementation 
structure consists of many units on different levels with numerous vertical and 
horizontal links. It also cuts across two sectors, the communications sector and 
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Figure 4: ICT to the poor implementation structure  
 
Structures can be closely integrated or may consist of several autonomous 
agencies (Christensen et al. 2007:37). Implementation structures can also be 
centralized or decentralized both with respect to the level on which decisions 
are taken and with respect to the administrative implementation structure (ibid). 
The communications sector and education sector had different organisational 
structures both with respect to the extent of centralisation and the degree of 
integration between units. 
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The communication sector had a loosely integrated and centralized 
implementation structure. It had a loosely integrate structure at the national 
level and at the local level. At the national level, the public authority was 
divided between the  DoC  as the policy maker and its two national and 
relatively autonomous implementing agents. These were an independent 
agency called USAASA and an independent regulator called ICASA. They will 
be discussed below. At the local level, the implementation structure was also 
loosely integrated and involved third parties such as NGOs or private 
companies, which will be discussed below. The communications sector was 
also centralized. The key implementation organisations were located at the 
national level. Local implementation structures were very weak and relied on 
cooperation with third parties. This will also be discussed more thoroughly 
underneath.  
The education sector had a very different structure. Firstly, it had a 
decentralized political and administrative structure where decisions were taken 
and implemented at the provincial level. Moreover, the education sector had a 
closely integrated, hierarchical structure where implementation takes place at 
various levels within the provincial Department of Education. 
As seen in the figure above, the telecentre and the market channels fell with the 
remit the  DoC . The educational channel on the other hand is located within 
the Department of Education.  
The specific tools and structures chosen to carry out the ICT to the poor policy 
intentions and the implementation processes these produced will be discussed 
in the following three sub-chapters. Each sub-chapter discusses the tools, 
structure and process of one of the three implementation channels. The chapters 
distinguish between the tools and structure of the implementation channels, on 
the one hand, and the process on the other. However, the distinction between 
structure and process are sometimes fuzzy in reality.  
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 5.1 Telecentre channel 
Structure 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 established a Universal Service and 
Access Fund (USAF).8 USAF subsidies constituted a key tool to provide ICT to 
the poor. The fund was financed by annual contributions from ICT operators.  
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 focused on improving access to basic 
voice telephony for needy persons and un-served communities. The mandate of 
the USAF in the 1996 Act was to subsidise the following: 
• To assist needy persons towards covering the cost of provision and usage 
of telecommunications (Republic of South Africa 1996:60.1). 
• To subsidise telecommunications companies with universal service 
obligations to roll out networks and services to un-served communities 
(ibid). 
The Telecommunication Amendment Act of 2001 added a focus on more 
advanced ICTs and included the following responsibilities to the mandate of 
the USAF: 
• To subsidise the procurement of internet services and equipment by 
public schools (Republic of South Africa 2001:66) 
• To subsidise the establishment of telecentres and information terminals in 
disadvantaged communities (ibid). 
• To assist small businesses and cooperatives to provide 
telecommunication services in disadvantaged areas (ibid).  
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 also established a Universal Service and 
Access Agency (USAASA)9 to manage the fund. The agency was an 
autonomous central agency located in the capital Pretoria and had only one 
representative in each of the nine provinces. Hence, it was a fairly top heavy 
                                            
8 The fund was named the Universal Service Fund in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and 
renamed Universal Service and Access Fund (USAF) in 2005. This thesis will use the latter name to 
avoid confusion. 
9 The agency was named Universal Service Agency in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and 




and centralized organisation and was forced to rely on third parties on the 
ground to delivery ICT access and services to the poor.  It had a loosely 
integrated structure that required cooperation with the  DoE and ICASA on the 
national level and third parties on the local level. 
Process 
Since its inception in 1997, USAASA had chosen to use the fund to establish 
telecentres in previously disadvantaged communities, although this was 
considered to be on the periphery of its mandate at the time. The decision was 
taken because of the difficulty of defining ‘needy persons’ and because the 
agency wanted to be in forefront of showing that people in disadvantaged 
communities benefit from using ICT (Interview 10). Telecentres consisted of 
approximately ten computers, a copy machine, printer, fax machine, internet, 
furniture and security measures. They were mostly established in existing 
buildings such as community halls, although some of the newer ones were 
established in schools or government information centres.  
USAASA provided between 150,000 and 200,000 Rands (120,330 and 160,440 
NOK) for equipment and technology per centre and established them in 
cooperation with local community organisations in disadvantaged communities. 
USAASA provided help to set up the business and pay for the first year of 
internet connection. After that, the ownership of the centre should be 
transferred to the local recipient and they would be given complete 
responsibility for managing the centre.  The centre was supposed to be run as a 
small, self-sustainable business and cover its own expenses through charging 
end-users or by obtaining subsidies from local government or private 
sponsorship:   
The telecentre is established in collaboration with the local community Non-
Governmental Organization. The NGO applying to operate and manage the 
Telecentre must be supported by the GCIS10 and the Local Government. The 
                                            
10 Government Communication and Information System (GCIS). 
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community-based organization can also apply for a Telecentre located in 
various community development centres. Ownership and management rests 
entirely with Community-based Entrepreneurs in partnership with the local 
government and private corporate sponsorships where the Telecentres are 
established and registered as a non-profitable entity. Revenue generated is 
used for the payment of expenses and acquiring additional equipment 
(USAASA 2005:9). 
 
5.2 Market channel 
Structure 
A central intention of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was to extend the 
fixed line and the cell phone network in order to provide access to basic 
telephone services to households and pay phones in poor communities. The 
tools adopted to achieve this were the Universal Service Obligations (USOs). 
The USOs were obligations given to the operators as a part of their license or in 
exchange for certain government benefits such as access to bandwidth. The 
operators were compelled to provide infrastructure and services to poor 
communities. The 2001 Amendment Act introduced a focus on internet access 
in schools. The provision of internet to schools was included in the USOs and a 
new tool called the ‘E-rate’, which was a 50% discount rate to all public 
schools on internet services, was introduced.  
An independent regulator called the Independent Communications Authority in 
South Africa (ICASA) was responsible for issuing licenses to the private 
operators.  ICASA therefore administered the USOs and was responsible for 
monitoring the companies’ compliance. The implementation of the USOs relied 
on the cooperation of private and quasi-public operators in the market. 
The context of the USOs was a strategy of gradual liberalisation of the 
telecommunications sectore in the post-apartheid era, as described in section 
4.2. The aim was to gradually move from a sector dominated by Telkom as the 
monopoly incumbent, through a process of liberalisation where new entrants 
where gradually introduced to enhance competition, to full liberalisation. 
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Telkom had an official monopoly in the fixed line sector between 1996 and 
2001 and MTN and Vodacom had a duopoly in the mobile sector. The 
Amendment Act in 2001 introduced several new licenses and officially ended 
Telkom’s monopoly and the duopoly in the mobile sector. The Electronic 
Communications Act of 2005 introduced a new licensing framework that 
cleared the way for full liberalisation and technology convergence. Hence, the 
issuing of the USOs followed these three phases from monopoly through 
managed liberalisation to full liberalisation.  
Process 
In the first round of legislation in 1996, Telkom was given the prime role in the 
universal service and access policy. It was given extensive USOs during its five 
year monopoly. The two mobile companies were not given new obligations, but 
they had been given obligations when their licenses were granted in 1993 
(Benjamin 2001; Hodge 2003:2). The obligations on Telkom, MTN and 
Vodacom are summarized in table 6.  
Table 6: Universal Service Obligations after the first round of legislation in 1996  
 Roll out obligations Community service obligations 
Telkom 2.69 million new lines of which: 
- 1.676 million should be in households in 
underserved areas. 
- 20,246 was for priority customers 
- 3,204 villages  
120,000 pay phones 
MTN 60% of the population coverage in 2 years 
70% of population coverage in 4 years 
7,500 community service telephones in 
underserved areas 
Low community service tariff 
Vodacom  60% of the population coverage in 2 years 
70% of population coverage in 4 years 
22,000 community service telephones 
in underserviced areas 
Low community service tariff 
Source: Hodge 2003:3-4. 
 The Telecommunications Amendment Act of 2001 invited companies to tender 
for a second network operator to compete with Telkom in the fixed line 
segment. It also issued a license to a mobile company called Cell C. In 
addition, it gave the state-owned company Sentech a license to provide internet 
services using satellite technology. All these operators were given USOs as a 
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part of their license to roll out networks, connect schools, and establish pay 
phones. These obligations are summarized in table 7.  
Table 7: Universal Service Obligations after the second round of legislation in 2001  
 Roll out obligations Community Service obligations 
Cell  8% geographic coverage in 5 years 
60% of the population in 5 year.  
52,000 community service telephones 
in underserved areas over 7 years. 
Low community tariffs 
Sentech 
multimedia 
 500 internet labs in rural schools over 
5 years 
SNO Coverage of all metropoles in 5 years 
80% of territory in 10 years 
30,000 community service telephones 
in rural areas over 10 years 
2,500 internet labs in rural schools 
over 5 years. 
 
Source: Hodge 2003:3-4. 
More recently, it had been decided that that the mobile operators should have 
extensive roll out obligations attached to their licenses in exchange for a 15 
year access to the 1,800 megahertz and the 2.4 gigahertz spectrum. A list of 
USOs formed part of their obligations. These included the provision of 250,000 
free cell phones and 4 million free SIM-cards over 5 years, as well as public 
payphones and internet labs in schools (Hodge 2003:5). The Head of the 
Compliance Unit within ICASA explains: 
All mobile operators had to interconnect at least 2,500 schools, the second 
fixed line operator had to connect 200 schools and one of the major ISPs 
had to connect 2,500 schools. The obligations were imposed in exchange 
for the granting of sought-after spectrum in the 2.5gigahertz band. It was 
not imposed on operators by virtue of the licence they held (Interview 45). 
 
 
More recently, the market channel seemed to have turned to more direct policy 
tools, such as using state-owned companies, to provide services to the poor. In 
2006, the Minister of Communications announced that the state-owned 
satellite signal distributor Sentech should become the cornerstone in bridging 
the digital divide and lowering the cost to communicate by rolling out a 
national wireless broadband network to disadvantaged areas using WiMax 
technology. The full implementation of a national network covering schools, 
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hospitals, clinics and Thusong centres11 was anticipated to be completed in 
2009. In addition, the Department of Public Enterprise established a new state-
owned enterprise called Broadband Infraco to roll out a fibre optic network. 
Broadband Infraco was licensed in October 2009 and given extensive USOs 
with clear targets, timeframes and a list of disadvantaged areas (ICASA 2009).  
It is apparent from this account that the regulatory framework became 
increasingly complex in the aftermath of the second legislative reform with the 
different operators having different USOs. What is more, the regulations also 
lacked a compliance system, which made surveillanceand enforcement difficult 
for the regulator. Consequently the companies could get away without fulfilling 
their obligations. The Head of the Compliance section in ICASA explained: 
 
Our telecoms compliance monitoring division was largely impaired by the 
difficulty in implementation of the various regulations and licence conditions 
that existed in terms of the previous dispensation. Although we had the express 
imposition of obligations, we did not previously have a system that ensures that 
we can effectively monitor compliance with the obligations. The same did not 
apply for the broadcasting environment. As a result, we are now moving to a 
model where regulations and obligation-imposing publications must spell out a 
compliance model. This will allow operators to know the extent to which they 
must comply and will assist the authority in identifying elements that must be 
monitored to ensure that we can measure whether there is compliance with a 
particular obligation (Interview 45).  
 
In the aftermath of the third legislative reform in 2005 the regulator started a 
process to review the universal service and access obligations. The new policy 
framework required all operators to have equal right and obligations, whereas 
under the previous dispensation they all had different obligations. This process 
was not yet finalized at the time when I conducted the fieldwork. The Head of 
the Compliance Section explained what was happening: 
Since the passing of the new legislation in 2005, all those licensees 
essentially have equal rights in theory. However, the obligations are still not 
equal. We are currently in a process of reviewing the obligations imposed, 
the effectiveness of the structure of the obligations and the fairness of 
continuing the disparate distribution of obligations. Depending on the 
                                            
11 The South African Government has tried to gather government services and information from 
differents departments under one roof in so-called Thusong centres in rural areas.  
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To summarize, the regulatory framework for the implementation of the USOs 
had become increasingly complex as the process of managed liberalization 
unfolded. These different USOs had not been backed up with a compliance 
model and were, therefore, very difficult for the regulator to implement.  
5.3 Education channel 
Structure 
Unlike the two other channels, the education channel was under the Department 
of Education. The education channel had a typical hierarchical implementation 
structure. The educational bureaucracy in KwaZulu-Natal consisted of 
hierarchically organized geographic units. On the top was the PDoE which 
developed policies, strategies and budgets based on national guidelines and 
provincial priorities. The PDoE was located in the provincial capital 
Pietermaritzburg and responsible for the 6,000 primary and secondary schools 
in the province. Below the PDoE, there were 12 school districts; below the 
districts, there were a number of circuits; and below the circuits a number of 
even smaller units called wards.  
The structure for delivering ICT to primary and secondary schools was called 
the ICT and Math, Science and Technology (MST/ICT) structure. This existed 
within the provincial educational structure described above and was similarly 
hierarchical. On top of this structure was the manager of ICT/MST in the PDoE 
and under him the Chief Education Specialist. The manager was the one 
responsible and accountable. Subordinated to him was an inter-district 
committee consisting of four Deputy Chief Educational Specialists on ICT who 
were responsible for three districts each. The manager and the inter-district 
committee were responsible for planning and budgeting. These had the 
operational planning and budgeting functions. Subordinated to this, each 
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district appointed one of its Chief Educational Specialists as the ICT 
coordinator of the district. Under him was the ward manager who was also 
responsible for ICT. The responsibility of the coordinators and ward managers 
were to assess the ‘e-readiness’ of schools, to identify schools without 
computers and to monitor and provide support to the schools with computers. 
The State Information and Technology Agency (SITA) was responsible for 
purchasing and delivering the computers.  
From my fieldwork it is apparent that the education channel, in contrast to the 
two others, had a decentralized and integrated structure. The goals of the 
channels were specified in provincial strategies, it was funded by government 
allocations and computers were delivered directly through a hierarchical 
bureaucratic implementation structure within the PDoE. It used direct tools for 
service delivery and generally did not rely on third parties.   
Process 
The process of recruiting and delivering ICT to schools through the educational 
channel were characterized by vertical chains of command and control.  The 
ICT manager and the inter-district committee made the plans and budgets for 
the delivery of computers based on the annual government allocations. The 
committee decided on a quota of computers and computer labs that should be 
delivered based on these plans and budgets. For example, in 2008 the quota in 
KwaZulu-Natal was 20 computer labs. These 20 computer labs were divided 
equally among the four inter-district committee-members. Thus, they were 
given five cyber labs each to be distributed to schools in their respective 
districts. The department directed its efforts towards previously disadvantaged 
areas and all the computer labs provided by the channel were established in 
poor communities. The Head of the MST/ICT section in the PDoE explained: 
The rural-urban divide is a big problem, which historically corresponds with 
white and black schools. We distinguish between schools in the richer and 
better areas and the ones in previously disadvantaged areas. The advantaged 
schools are 30% of the schools in KwaZulu-Natal or 1,200.  All of them have 
computer labs and 80% have internet. Therefore we focus on the remaining 
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4,800 schools in KwaZulu-Natal that are disadvantaged schools (Interview 
27). 
 
The identification of schools to receive computer labs was made on the basis of 
lists and recommendations from the lower levels of the bureaucracy, The ward 
manager at the bottom of the hierarchy compiled a list of schools that were 
lacking ICTs in their ward and assessed their level of ‘ICT readiness’, which 
included electricity and security. These lists and recommendations were sent to 
the ICT coordinator in the district. He compiled a list of all the schools that 
lacked ICTs and sent this to the district committee. The district committee then 
made a decision based on the criteria of need and level of e-readiness that 
included security measures, electricity and the level of ICT knowledge among 
the teachers.  There were, however, allegations among my informants that 
clientalist politics and networks influenced which were chosen schools. For 
example, the Deputy Chief Education Specialist of Umlazi stated:  
Both Ochlange and Adams Mission are important schools that are favoured 
by politicians. They have a long history, many politicians went there and 
therefore they have high priority. The ex-Minister of Health went to Adams 
Mission and the founder of the ANC went to Ochlange (Interview 37). 
After identifying schools, the district committee sent the final list further up the 
hierarchy where the right signatures from various officials had to be collected. 
Thereafter, the state-owned SITA was responsible for purchasing and 
delivering the ICT equipment to schools. A problem stressed by several of my 
informants was the time-consuming process of procurement, which meant that 
the schools had to wait very long before they got their computers. The Deputy 
Chief Education Specialist ICT in the inter-district committee stated: 
Procurement is a big problem and it is making things take so long. Reporting 
has to go through so many people before it reaches the destination. I think 
things would move much faster if it weren’t for that. In fact, the CEO has not 
signed the document allocating the 48 computer labs for this year yet. So we 
have to be patient and wait for orders. When the document is signed and the 
SITA has delivered the computers to the schools then we go and monitor 
(Interview 39).  
 
Another problem was the limited capacity and high prices of SITA which was 
the government body in charge of purchasing and delivering the computers for 
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the PDoE. One of the Chief Education Specialists in the inter-district ICT 
Committee stated: 
We decide based on the budget, level of e-readiness and the number of 
schools in the district, the number of computers and computer labs that 
should be distributed per district. Then we send the list to SITA, which is the 
government body buying and delivering computers. However, they are 
charging the DoE to do this and it is ripping us off. They also have little 




The PDoE delivered new computer labs as a one-time grant with a two-year 
warranty. Beyond that, the schools had to cover the cost of maintenance and 
repairs with their school budgets. It was up to the school to operate the 
computers, but the ICT coordinators monitored and supported those schools 
with the computer labs.  
The process described above shows that the hierarchical implementation 
structure created an implementation process characterized by vertical chains of 
command and control. The implementation process was controlled from the top 
where provincial political authorities set the targets and allocated budgets and 
the bureaucrats involved in implementation had clearly specified roles. 
5.4 The characteristics of the channels 









Table 8: Delivery channels for the ICT to the poor policy in South Africa 
Channel Tool Delivery 
system 
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The telecentre channel relied on USF subsidies as its key tool for service 
delivery to the poor. The USF subsidies were used to establish telecentres in 
poor communities in cooperation with local community actors.   
The private channel employed USOs as its key tool. The USOs relied on 
private, quasi-public and public companies for delivery. The product delivered 
by the market channel varied, but seemed to focus on voice telephony in 
households and computer labs with internet to schools in disadvantaged 
communities. 
The education channel relied on direct delivery through the PDoE. The product 
it delivered was computers and teacher training. The recipient institution was 
the schools, which were at the bottom of the bureaucracy. The target group was 
pupils and teachers in schools in disadvantaged communities. 
The channels can be said to have different structural characteristics. These are 




Table 9: Characteristics of the three implementation channels 























The telecentre channel had a centralized and loosely integrated implementation 
structure. It consisted of USAASA, an autonomous single-purpose central 
implementation agency that delivered telecentres to local third parties. Its local 
implementation structure consisted of one person per province. The channel 
was also largely indirect since it relied on capacitated third parties on the 
ground for the successful delivery of services to the poor. Since successful 
implementation on the ground relied on the cooperation between local actors 
and USAASA, the channel can be said to have a network structure. In this 
structure the USAASA should be a financial institution paying subsidies to 
third parties that would implement the policy. Hence, the agency did not need 
strong local structures. However, as the implementation process shows, 
USAASA chose to purchase and deliver telecentres itself to organisations in 
local communities. These organisations often lacked the capacity to manage the 
centres and hence, the USAASA had continued to stay involved to provide 
support to the local organisation. USAASA nevertheless lacked the local 
structure and capacity to do this properly.   
The market channel also had a centralized and loosely integrated structure. It 
consisted of a central independent regulator who was supposed to manage the 
process of phased liberalisation. A part of this was the issuing of new licenses 
with universal service obligations. The regulator utilised quasi-public 
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(Telkom),12 private (the cell phone companies) and public (Sentech) companies 
for implementation . It can thus be argued that the USOs are an indirect tool 
since it relies on companies operating in a competitive market. It is apparent, 
however, that the nature of the ownership affects the nature of the service 
delivery. It can be argued that when the USOs were applied to the state-owned 
company Sentech they were more direct than when they were applied to the 
private cell phone operators or the increasingly privately-owned Telkom 
(Telkom 2010). It can be said that the degree of indirectness of the USOs 
increased in the post-apartheid era as the policy of managed liberalisation 
unfolded. The notable exception was the USOs of the state-owned companies 
Sentech and Infraco. The USOs thus had different degrees of directness 
depending on the ownership of the company.  
Since the channel depended on companies operating in the market, it can be 
said to utilise a market structure. In order for this structure to work effectively a 
strong and capacitated regulator is required to negotiate licences with universal 
service obligations with the big companies dominating the sector (Telkom, 
MTN, Vodacom, Cell C). It also needed a capacitated compliance section to 
monitor the companies’ compliance with the USOs and sanction them in cases 
of non-compliance. However, as shown above, the regulator struggled with 
capacity problems and was not capable of implementing the increasingly 
complicated regulatory framework. Also, the compliance section within the 
regulator was weak and lacked the capacity to monitor the companies’ USO 
compliance.  
The educational channel and its decentralized and tightly-integrated 
hierarchical structure stood in sharp contrast to the two other channels. Both 
political and administrative authority was decentralized to the provincial level. 
The provincial government adopted provincial plans with clear targets, 
                                            
12 As discussed in chapter 4.2 Telkom was gradually privatized in the post-apartheid period. In 1997, 
30% of Telkom's shares were sold to SABC and Telkom Malaysia. It has been further privatized and in 
2010 the government had a 39.8% stake in Telkom (Telkom official website 2009). 
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timeframes and budgets. These were implemented through the hierarchically 
organized provincial education bureaucracy. In the case of the ICT priorities 
this was the MST/ICT, which consisted of tightly integrated subunits. Since the 
educational bureaucracy and the state-owned agency SITA were responsible for 
the delivery of computers to schools, the channel can be said to rely on direct 
tools. This implementation structure consisted of clear vertical lines of control 




6. Results on the ground 
This chapter answers sub-question III in the thesis: what are the results of the 
policy on the ground?  
The first three sections respectively consider the telecentre, education and 
market channels. Each of these sections has an introduction that outlines the 
overall intention of the channel and the results of the channel at the national 
and provincial level. In each section this is followed by a presentation of the 
specific results on the ground in the schools, households and telecentres in the 
three case communities. The fourth and final section examines the outcome of 
all the three channels by looking at usage levels of computers and internet in 
the three case communities. Based on the intentions of the three channels, some 
indicators have been developed to assess their performance. These are 
presented in table 10. 
Table 10: Performance indicators for the three implementation channels 
 Telecentre channel Market channel Education channel 
1.  The number of telecentres 
established by the 
Telecentre channel 
The companies’ fulfilment 
of USOs 
The number of computer 
labs established by the 
educational channel 
2.  The number of operating 
telecentres in the three case 
communities that provide 
basic telecentre services 
The % of  households with 
a cell phone in the  three 
case communities 
The number of schools with 
cyber lab in the three case 
communities 
3.  The number of training 
courses per week in the 
telecentres in the three case 
communities 
The % of people who used 
a pay phone within the past 
six months in the three 
communities 
The number of schools with 
trained teachers in the three 
case communities 
4.  The number of users per 
centre per day 
The number of schools with 
computer lab connected to 
internet in the three case 
communities 
 
5.  That services are subsidized  The number of schools that 
receive E-rate in the three 
case communities 
 
6.  The number of paid staff in 
the telecentres in the three 
case communities 
  
7.  Whether the telecentre 
managers thought the 





The results in the telecentre and the schools will be assessed on the basis of the 
interviews and observations conducted during fieldwork, as well as data from 
annual reports where available. The results of the market channel, on the other 
hand, will be discussed based on secondary data such as research reports and 
data collected in the CLIQ survey on household access to ICTs in the three case 
communities. The reason for this asymmetry is that the market regulator did not 
publish results on their website nor in readily accessible annual reports. In fact, 
even the head of the compliance section in ICASA did not know to what extent 
the companies had complied with their USOs (Interview 45). The CLIQ data 
are, therefore, used to show the results on the ground because these give a good 
impression of household access levels in the three case communities.  
6.1 Telecentre channel 
The policy intentions of the telecentre channel were to establish telecentres in 
disadvantaged communities in order to provide various ICT services to the 
poor. By 2008, eleven years after its inception, the telecentre channel had only 
established 389 telecentres in the whole country. Of these, 155 were run by 
community entrepreneurs or organisations, while 234 where located in and 
managed by schools (USAASA 2008a).  (In comparison, the educational 
channel had delivered 604 computer labs in KwaZulu-Natal in three years.) 
Moreover, USAASA’s 2007-08 Annual Report states that many of the 
telecentres had fundamental problems and did not operate effectively (ibid).  A 
USAASA report from 2005 stated that the telecentres struggled with the 
following factors: 
1) the limited human capacity to manage and operate the ICT facilities  
2) the under-utilization of ICT facilities due to lack of computer training and skills 
among staff  
3) high rates of technical failure, especially internet connectivity 
4) the high cost of ICTs  
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5) that ICT applications were sometimes inappropriate to meet the needs of the 
communities they serve and  
6) various social, economic, political and cultural conditions (USASA 2005:4) 
 
Table 10 summarizes my fieldwork observations of the telecentre channel in 
the three poor communities.  
Table 11: Output indicators for the telecentre channel 
 Telecentres Sicabazini Adams Mission Inanda 
1. Number of operating telecentres that 
provide basic telecentre services 
1 1 1 
2. Number of training courses per week 
in the telecentres  
0 2 15 
3. Number of users per centre per day 3 10-15 50 
4. Services are affordable  No Yes Yes 
5. Number of paid staff in the telecentres  0 0 5 
6. Whether the telecentre managers 
thought the telecentre was successful 
No No Yes 
 
All the three telecentres visited during fieldwork were operating and offered 
basic telecentre services such as computer and internet access, photocopying, 
printing, faxing and typing. The Telecentre Manager in Inanda said: 
What we are doing here is that we are selling basic telecommunication 
services. Typing, printing, photocopying, faxing, laminating, scanning, email 
and so forth, and we are basically the only centre in the community 
(Interview 8). 
 
The telecentres varied more with respect to the training courses they offered. 
The telecentre in Sicabazini had previously offered a training course for the 
pupils in the surrounding schools. Vuvuzela had installed software on the 
computers that included a training course. However, to access the computers 
with the Vuvuzela software the users had to buy vouchers. In the start phase of 
the centre, Vuvuzela had provided free vouchers in order to enable the 
telecentre managers to get the business going. However, just before my 
77 
 
fieldwork, they had closed down the free account and begun charging. The 
pupils could not afford to pay for vouchers and the telecentre managers had to 
close down the course. Hence, the telecentre in Sicabazini was not providing 
any type of training course at the time of my fieldwork.  The telecentre 
managers had not been satisfied with the training course software provided by 
Vuvuzela because it did not target the needs in the community. Firstly, it was in 
English while the most people in the area only spoke Zulu. Secondly, it solely 
targeted children and not adults who also needed to learn computers. Thirdly, it 
was not interactive. Finally it was designed for people who already knew the 
basics of computer use. 
The telecentre in Adams Mission offered the possibility of computer practice 
for people taking Adult Based Education Training classes and for pupils at the 
surrounding schools. These were not taught classes, but the telecentre was open 
for these two groups to come and practice and the telecentre manager or her 
assistant were there to offer support as best as they could. The telecentre also 
had an agreement with University of South Africa, which offered remote 
teaching, so that the university paid for its students to use the internet. 
 
The telecentre in Inanda offered a high number of computer classes tailored to 
the different needs in the community. The management realized that most 
people did not know how to use the computers or the internet and that there 
was a major need for training courses. The centre offered three classes a day 
that were tailored to the needs of different groups in the community such as old 
people, young people, small businesses, women, health workers and security 
personnel. They also had campaigns to recruit new user groups.  One example 
of how new services were developed was a campaign they had that targeted 
women. The telecentre managers realised that the majority of their users were 
men and wanted to increase the number of women using the centre. They went 
to visit different women’s groups in the community, mapped their potential ICT 
needs and asked them why they were not using the centre. Thereafter, they 
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tailored a course to suit these women. The training courses had become so 
popular that there was limited space left for community members who just 
wanted to use the normal telecentre services. As a result the telecentre wanted 
to expand. The telecentre manager in Inanda explained: 
The other thing that we realized when we opened the centre was that many 
people that are coming here don’t know or they cannot do things for 
themselves. They cannot just go into the computer and type and email so we 
thought we needed to start some kind of a skills programme that are going to 
empower them. So we started that program. But it created bit of a problem 
because we ended up having more people interested in the training 
programme – so much so that we don’t have space for people who are 
coming in ad hoc to use the computers because the computers are always full 
of people who want to learn how to use the computer (Interview 8). 
 
In addition to the training courses, the telecentre also had a refurbishment 
centre, which repaired computers for the telecentre, as well as for the 
surrounding schools and households at cheap rates. The refurbishment centre 
also trained unemployed youth in the community to do computer repairs and in 
doing so providing them with skills to get a job or start their own business. 
With respect to usage, the centres also varied a lot. The telecentre in Sicabazini 
was, according to its managers, only used by around 20 people a week. The 
most used services in both Sicabazini and Adams Mission were photocopying 
and printing. Few community members came to use the computers 
independently and even fewer came to use the internet. Only around five 
people a week were using the internet and these were tourists. The manager of 
the Community Development Centre in which the telecentre was located stated: 
Unfortunately, not so many people use the centre. Before, it was used a lot 
because the school kids used to come here. But they don’t come anymore 
because they don’t get free vouchers, and it’s too expensive for them. (…) 
What I can say is that the groups who are using the centres are only school 
kids and community people coming for photocopying. Only tourists use the 
internet. It is not easy with the internet because they don’t know how to use 
the internet. They don’t know how to use a computer. We are in the rural 
areas (Interview 12).  
 
One of the telecentre managers said: 
Around 20 people use the centre a week in total. The community come for 
copying mostly, the teachers come for printing. The printing is good and 
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affordable, the copying is not so good because it is slow and too light so 
people complain. The fax does not print a slip. The internet and the 
computers are not used by the community because it is not affordable [due to 
the voucher problem]. The internet is used mainly by tourists from the 
Mtembe Elephant Park and from people staying in the centre accommodation 
(Interview 17). 
 
The telecentre in Adams Mission was used by between 10 and 15 people a day, 
but most of these came to use the phone or photocopying facilities (Interview 
6). The telecentre manager in Adams Mission stated: 
There are especially four groups who use the centre. Approximately four 
UNISA long distance students use the centre for internet a week.  This is the 
only group using the internet and they are not necessarily from Adams 
mission. ABET [Adult Based Education Training] learners come for basic 
computer training. Pupils from the surrounding schools come for basic 
computer training on Saturdays, but not for the internet. People from the 
community come for photocopying, typing CVs, printing and phones. Not for 
the internet (Interview 6). 
 
 
As mentioned above, the telecentre in Inanda offered a wide range of training 
courses suited to the different needs. Therefore the centre was widely used by 
different groups in the community. The telecentre manager estimated that as 
many as 50 people used the centre each day. Their training courses had 
introduced a large number of people to the benefits of ICTs and provided them 
with the necessary skills to use the computers and the internet effectively. The 
training courses were indeed so popular that it was hard for the telecentre 
manager to find space to those not taking the course. The telecentre therefore 
wanted to expand. That the telecentre in Inanda was more widely used than the 
other centres may be related to the fact that it was in an urban location with a 
high population density. However, also Adams Mission had a high population 
density and was not that much further from Durban. Hence, I would argue that 
the training courses and the low prices were crucial contributing components 
behind the high number of users in Inanda.  
USAASA paid the internet bill for the telecentre in Adams Mission. The 
telecentre charged low prices and was not strict in demanding payment because 
80 
 
of the high level of poverty in the area. As a result the telecentre did not make 
enough money to cover the payment of staff salaries.  
The telecentre in Sicabazini did not, at the time of my fieldwork, receive any 
operational subsidies from USAASA, the Peace Foundation or Vuvuzela. It had 
been given free vouchers from Vuvuzela to establish the business, but the 
account had been closed down. From that point onwards the community 
members had to buy vouchers in order to use the centre. The cost of vouchers 
was a significant barrier that prevented many community members from using 
the internet. One of the telecentre managers stated: 
It is hard for people to buy the vouchers. The fifty Rand that the students paid 
for the course is only two hours and that is not enough time to learn properly. 
What I can say is the vouchers are killing the centre. The reason is that it is 
Vuvuzela’s business. As a result the school kids are not coming here anymore 
because they cannot afford to buy vouchers each and every time they come to 
use the computers for training. So the business is still running slowly and we 
are not making any money (Interview 17). 
 
The other telecentre manager in Sicabazini stated:  
We are struggling to provide services in a good way to the community 
because the rate of poverty and unemployment is too high. People want 
computer training, but we cannot give it to them because of the prices of 
vouchers from Vuvuzela (Interview 18).  
 
Moreover, all the money the centre received from customers was used to pay 
the internet bill. Indeed, the telecentre had to borrow money from the 
Community Centre in which it was located in order to pay for the internet. This 
is ironic because the internet was not even used by the community members, 
but rather by tourists visiting the nearby elephant park.  
In Inanda, an NGO called Isibani Solunto paid the telecentre staff, which 
included the manager, trainers and technician. Neither the telecentre in 
Sicabazini nor the telecentre in Adams Mission paid their staff. These two 
centres were supposed to run as a sustainable business and cover their own 
costs. However, according to all the telecentre managers it was impossible to 
run the centre as a sustainable business given the high prices on ICT and the 
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low levels of purchasing power and ICT awareness in their communities. The 
manager of the community centre in which the telecentre in Sicabazini was 
located stated: 
The peace foundation introduced it as a business and the people who are 
running it is the telecentre managers. They are running it as a business and 
they are renting the premises including electricity, but they are not 
renting now because the business is not running well, but when the business 
are better they will pay rent (Interview 12). 
 
I don’t know – we are not benefiting that well for this business. We have 
purchased the catridge that they are using because they are not able to pay 
for their expenses. They have to pay for connectivity and transport. 
Especially one of the telecentres managers is living so far away and she 
has to have the money for transport to come to work everyday and they 
are not getting any salaries. So I have met them halfway, I bought the 
cartridge so they are able to go on with the business, but it is not working 
that well (ibid). 
 
Only the managers in Inanda viewed their telecentre as a success. The 
telecentre managers in Sicabazini and Adams Mission said that the telecentres 
were not a success.  
The analysis indicates that the telecentre in Inanda has been the most 
successful. It provided a range of training courses, was widely used by people 
in the community, had paid staff and was considered a success by the telecentre 
manager. The two other centres are less successful with Adams Mission being 
more successful than Sicabazini. 
To summarize, the results of the telecentre channel were meagre. At the 
national level it established only 389 telecentres between its inception in 1997 
and 2008. Only two of the three most successful telecentres in the province of 
KwaZulu-Natal are used by more than 15 people a day and the community only 
uses the internet in one of the three centres. During my fieldwork I visited two 
other telecentres in KwaZulu-Natal which were not operating at all.  
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6.2 Market channel 
The central intentions of the market channel was to provide fixed line and 
cellular network and services poor households and to provide internet 
connections to schools at a discounted E-rate. 
Access in households 
The CLIQ survey asked questions about access to ICT in households in the 
three case communities. Table 11 shows that only 13.2% of the households in 
the three case communities had a working fixed line phone in their dwelling. 
The CLIQ survey also found that only 61.5% of the respondents in the 
communities had used a fixed line payphone within the last three months. This 
is far from universal service and hardly impressive. However, the CLIQ survey 
found that as many as 91.4% of the respondents had a cell phone at home, 
which indicates that the cell phone companies had achieved results that were 
above and beyond their specified targets. This is impressive and close to 
universal access. Table 11 shows that only 6.3% of the sample had access to a 
computer in their dwelling and 6.9% live in a household in which someone had 
access the internet. It can be seen that access to fixed lines, computers and the 
internet are lower in the rural Sicabazini than in the urban Inanda and the peri-
urban Adams Mission. Access to cell phones does not follow this pattern. 








%  Cell phone 79 of 88 
(89.8%) 
46 of 47 
(97. 8%) 
34 of 39 
(87. 2%) 
159 of 174 
(91.4%) 
%  Fixed line 3 of 88 
(3.4%) 
7 of 47 
(14.9%) 
13 of 39 
(33.3%) 
23 of 174 
(13.2%) 
%  Computer 2 of 88 
(2.2%) 
5 of 47 
(10.6%) 
4 of 38 
(10.5%) 
11 of 173 
(6.3%) 
% Internet*  4 of 87 
(4.6%) 
3 of 47 
(6.4%) 
5 of 39 
(12.8%) 
12 of 173 
(6.9%) 
* % of people where someone has access the internet through a cell phone or a computer 




A key intention of the policy was to roll out the fixed line network. In the first 
legislative reform Telkom were given a monopoly and substantial USOs to 
provide fixed line services to poor household. Telkom made huge investments 
and fell just 11,448 lines short of the 2.69 million target for new lines to be 
installed between 1997 and 2002 (Hodge 2003, Makhaya and Roberts 2003). 
The network was almost fully digitalized by mid-2002, and installation and 
repair times had decreased dramatically (ibid).  
From 2001, however, there were mass disconnections from the fixed line 
network. In 2001 and 2002, the rate of disconnections exceeded the rate of 
connections, resulting in a net decrease in the total number of fixed lines. In 
2001, 630,000 new lines were rolled out, but there were total disconnections of 
1,160,000 lines, which resulted in a net decrease of 530,000 fixed line users. 
Similarly, in 2002, 570,000 new lines were rolled out, but of these 606,000 
lines were disconnected, a decline of 36,000 lines (Hodge 2003:6). The 
majority of these disconnections were in previously disadvantaged 
communities among inhabitants who could not afford to pay (Makhaya and 
Roberts 2003). Hodge (2003:6) estimates the cost of fixed line connections that 
were later disconnected to be 17 billion Rand (13.7 billion NOK). 
The second legislative reform invited companies to tender to become a second 
national operator in competition with Telkom. However, the licensing process 
that followed was slow. In fact, the second national operator, NEOTEL, was 
not licensed until 2005, did not begin operating until the middle of 2006, and 
was still only operating on a very limited basis in 2007 (Esselaar and Gillwald 
2007:16). Hence, it had not yet started to implement its Universal Service 
Obligations in May 2008. Another central intention had been to provide cellular 
services to poor households. Hence, the cell phone companies MTN and 
Vodacom were given obligations to roll out network and services. By 1996 
Vodacom and MTN had achieved the license obligations given to them in 1993 
already (Hodge 2003; Benjamin 2001a). The obligations on the cell phone 
companies to roll out networks have been considered a success (Hodge 2003; 
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Esselaar and Gillwald 2006). Cell C granted a new license in the wake of the 
Telecommunications Amendment Act (2001). By 2006, Cell C had met its 
obligations (Esselaar and Gilwald 2006:26).   
More recently, the Minister of Communications announced that the state-
owned companies Sentech and Infraco would provide broadband networks to 
poor communities through USOs. However, Sentech applied to the national 
treasury for 3.1 billion Rands to build a network covering schools, hospitals, 
clinics and Thusong centres in disadvantaged areas, but was only granted 500 
million Rands with no commitment for further funding (Sentech 2008). As a 
result this network will not be built (ibid). The roll out of Infraco’s network 
had not begun at the time of my fieldwork.  
Access to internet and E-rate in schools 
Table 12 shows that of the ten schools visited, only two had a computer lab 
with an internet connection and that none schools received an E-rate. This is 
hardly impressive.  
Table 13: Number of schools with internet and an E-rate in the three case 
communities  
 Sicabazini Adams Mission Inanda Total 
Number of schools 
with internet 
0 0 2 2 
Number of schools 
with E-rate 
0 0 0 0 
Total number of 
schools visited  
2 4 4 10 
 
Of the two schools that had an internet connection, both were located in the 
urban community of Inanda and both received an internet connection from 
MTN. Only one of these computer labs was still in use. In the other one, the 
computers with the internet connection had been stolen.  
According to the regulator, it was unable to monitor the companies’ compliance 
with their USOs because of the lack of a compliance model, the increasing 
complexity of the regulatory framework and the compliance section’s limited 
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capacity. One of the Deputy Chief Education Specialists for ICT in the inter-
district committee in DoC KwaZulu-Natal stated:   
The DoC has connected some schools. ICASA distributed quotas to all the 
service providers. The mobile companies were to connect 500 schools. 
Vodacom is the only one that has reported that it has only connected 138 
schools. Cell C and MTN have not reported (Interview 33). 
 
None of the schools received an E-rate on their internet services and only one 
of the teachers I spoke with had heard even about it.  PDoE bureaucrats were 
frustrated with the failure to implement the E-rate. One of the Deputy Chief 
Education Specialists for ICT in the inter-district committee stated:   
The E-rate is not clear and not happening! We are confused. We do not have 
information and we do not know what is happening. I suspect that the 
companies do not want to comply. They do not just want to give discounts if 
they are not subsidised. ICASA visited us about the E-rate, but they said that 
some things were not clear yet and they never came back to us. We do not 
have information! What is going on? I think there is some business 
somewhere stopping it (Interview 33). 
 
To summarize, the performance of the market channel was mixed. It has been 
relatively unsuccessful with respect to providing fixed line phones to 
households and internet at an E-rate discount to schools, but it has been very 
successful in providing cell phones to households.  
6.3. Education channel 
The policy intention of the school channel was to provide computers for 
administrative purposes and computer labs, and train teachers to make use of 
them. The provision of internet was left to the private operators. In terms of 
numbers the educational channel was far more effective than the telecentre 
channel. In KwaZulu-Natal alone it provided 604 computer labs in the three 
years before my fieldwork and trained two thousand teachers a year (interview 
28). All the 604 computer labs were located in previously disadvantaged 
communities (ibid). This was in sharp contrast to the telecentre channel, which, 
with its huge fund, had only managed to provide 389 telecentres and cyber labs 
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in schools in the whole country in eleven years. In quantitative terms the 
education channel is clearly more successful.  
Table 13 summarizes the results of the education channel in the three 
communities. It shows that both Inanda and Adams Mission have schools 
with a computer lab in use, while Sicabazini does not.  
Table 14: Output indicators for the education channel 
Performance indicators Sicabazini Adams 
Mission 
Inanda Total 
Number of schools with a computer 
for administrative purposes 
1 4 4 9 
Number of schools with computer 
lab 
1 4 2 7 
Number of schools with computer 
lab connected to internet 
0 1 1 2 
Number of schools with trained 
teachers 
0 4 2 6 
Total number of schools visited 2 4 5 10 
 
Of the ten schools visited during fieldwork, all but one had at least one 
computer for administrative purposes. The school without any computers was 
located in the remote area of Sicabazini and lacked both electricity and a fixed 
line telephone so the teachers had to rely on their private cell phones for phone 
calls.  
Seven of the ten schools had a computer lab with between eight and thirty 
working computers. Six of the computer labs were in use and these were all 
located in the urban community of Inanda or the peri-urban community 
Adams Mission – four in Adams Mission and two in Inanda. The computer 
lab in Sicabazini had just recently been established and the school had not yet 
started to use it.  
The schools were better able to put the computer labs into use than the 
telecentres. The schools all had a budget and the teachers were paid and 
trained to teach with ICT. In high schools, the computers where mainly used 
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to teach Computer Application Technology (CAT), while in primary schools 
they were used for normal classes. A central challenge for the teachers was 
that there were often far fewer working computers than pupils. For example, in 
Ochlange High School, where many of the computers had been stolen, there 
were only eight computers for a class of thirty pupils. The teachers found it 
very challenging to teach a practical subject like CAT with such a high pupil 
to computer ratio (Interview 21). 
Six of the schools with computer labs had at least one teacher who had 
received a one-week training course from the  PDoE where they learnt to use 
and teach ICT.  
To summarize, the school channel had established 604 computer labs in schools 
in three years. In comparison USAASA had only established 389 telecentres in 
12 years. Moreover, on the ground nine out of ten schools had a computer for 
administrative purposes and seven of the ten schools had a computer lab. All 
the schools with a computer lab had at least one trained teacher. Also, the 
schools seemed more capable than the telecentres in operating the computer 
labs as they had a budget and the teachers were paid. This indicates that the 
education channel have been relatively successful.   
6.4 Usage of ICT in case communities 
Table 14 summarizes the number of working telecentres, computer labs in 
schools and computer labs in schools with an internet connection. It shows that 
all the communities had access to a telecentre and had at least one computer lab 
in a school. Only Inanda had two schools with a computer lab connected to the 





Table 15: Outputs on the ground in three communities 
Name of 
community 
Number of working 
telecentres 
Number of computer 
labs in schools 
Number of computer 
labs in schools with an 
internet connection 
Sicabazini 1 1 0 
Adams Mission 1 3 0 
Inanda 1 2 2 
Total 3 5 2 
 
However, even though all of the communities had a telecentre and at least one 
school with a computer lab, table 15 shows that the CLIQ survey found that 
67% of the respondents in the three communities had never used a computer 
before and 77% had not used a computer within the last 6 months. 
Unsurprisingly, given the outputs of the policy, an even higher percentage, 85% 
had never used the internet before. This is hardly impressive given the major 
focus on access to ICT among the poor in the legislative framework.  










Have never used computer 
before 
82.8% 
(72 of 87) 
46. 2% 
(18 of 39) 
55.3 % 
(26 of 47) 
67% 
(116 of 173) 
Have not used a computer 
within the last 6 months 
91.8% 
(67 of 73) 
48.7% 
(19 of 39) 
79% 
(34 of 43) 
77% 
(120 of 155) 
Have never used internet 
before 
89.2% 
(74 of 83) 
65.7% 
(23 of 35) 
91.5% 
(43 of 47) 
85% 
(140 of 165) 
*those who did not answer are excluded    
Source: CLIQ 2008  
 
Table 15 also shows that a higher proportion of the respondents in urban Inanda 
had used computers and the internet compared to the peri-urban Adams 
Mission and rural Sicabazini. This stems most likely from the fact that Inanda 
was the only community in the sample with a successful telecentre that 
provided a wide range of training courses for different groups in the 
community, and it was also the only community in the sample with a school 
computer lab connected to the internet. On the other hand the high proportion 
of people in Sicabazini and Adams Mission who had not accessed the internet 
makes sense because the schools were not connected to the internet and 
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according to the telecentre managers the community members did not use the 
internet connection in the telecentres. Furthermore, it seems that Adams 
Mission had a higher number of computer users than Sicabazini because the 
former had three schools with a computer lab and provided two computer 
training courses a week for the community, while the latter only had one school 
with a computer lab, which was not operating yet, and a telecentre that charged 




7. Towards an Explanation 
This section will answer sub-question IV: what explains the results? It will start 
with a summary of the results of the three channels and thereafter consider the 
empirical findings that might explain these results.   
The results on the ground indicated that the market channel had performed well 
with respect to providing access to cell phones in poor households, but not so 
well with respect to providing fixed line phones in households and connecting 
schools to the internet at an E-rate discount. It was, therefore, a partial failure.  
The telecentre channel established only 389 telecentres in the whole of South 
Africa in eleven years, many of which are not functioning properly. This was 
evident in the three case communities, where two of the three most successful 
centres in KwaZulu-Natal were facing fundamental problems. This indicates 
that the telecentre channel had not been very successful.  
The school channel seemed to have performed better than the other two. In 
KwaZulu-Natal alone it had established 604 school computer labs in three 
years and had trained two thousand teachers in one year. All the schools that I 
visited had at least one computer for administrative purposes and seven out of 
ten schools had a computer lab and trained teachers. Generally speaking, the 
school computer labs were also better managed than the telecentres.  
It is apparent that, based on the data presented in this thesis, the ICT to the poor 
policy has only been partly successful. What is more, the school channel had 
been more successful than the market and the telecentre channel. Below, I seek 
to explain using empirical data, how these variations in outputs across the three 
channels can be explained. This analysis will focus on the different tools and 
structures chosen to frame their respective implementation processes. 
There were major differences in the tools and structures utilised by the 
education channel, on the one hand, and the telecentre and the market channels 
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on the other. The education channel had clear goals, relied on direct delivery 
tools, and had a decentralized, tightly integrated and hierarchical 
implementation structure. The market and telecentre channels, however, had 
unclear goals, a centralized and a loosely integrated structure that relied on 
third parties at the local level. This made implementation difficult and 
effectiveness rested on the will and capacity of the third parties that were 
involved. 
7.1 Telecentre channel 
The original intention of the telecentre channel was that USAASA, as a central 
financial agency, would pay USAF subsidies to third parties – either consumers 
or companies – to ensure affordable household access to voice telephony in 
poor communities. Hence, the structure established was centralised, loosely 
integrated and relied on third parties for successful implementation. In 2001, 
the amendment of the act included a focus on delivering more advanced ICTs, 
but without changing the structure of the channel. Its focus remained on 
delivering access in terms of infrastructure and technology.  
In practice, USAAASA deviated from these original intentions. The approach 
chosen by USAASA, has since its inception in 1997, been to deliver telecentres 
that offered more advanced ICT, such as computers, to poor communities.13 
The basic idea was that USAASA would pay for and deliver ICT equipment to 
establish a telecentre. This would be given to a community organisation, which 
would run the telecentre as a sustainable business. USAASA would pay for the 
internet for one year, but after that responsibility for operation rested entirely 
with the third party organisation.  
                                            
13 As seen in chapter 5.1, the establishment of telecentres was not included in the USAF fund untill in the 
Telecommunication Amendment Act of 2001.  
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My fieldwork indicated that, at least initially, USAASA had been mainly 
concerned with providing access to infrastructure and technology. The 
provincial representative of USAASA stated: 
We have been mostly concerned in providing access points. That was our main drive, 
but later on we felt ok, if there is a locally based organization it might be providing 
other services to the community and then they can add the telecentre as an add on. For 
example, there may be a women’s organisation involved in farming, but over and 
above that they may run the telecentre business. So that was the idea (Interview 10).  
 
The head of the policy section within the Department of Communications 
(DoC) reiterated this point: 
USAASA has been responsible for providing access. But in the past they have 
focused on access in a physical sense. And, as you perhaps know, without real 
success stories because it was about technology dumping. As long as they put 
up a 100 telecentres or put computers in 50 community centres then they had 
done the job. Whether the computers were used or not has not been the focus 
and that is a problem (Interview 41). 
 
Hence, USAASA did not pay sufficient attention to the organisations that were 
to run the telecentres. Even the Head of the USAF underlined this point: 
I personally believe that the telecentre is a good model. However, one of the 
areas we are criticizing ourselves for is that we focused on physically rolling out 
telecentres, whereas little attention was given to the organization running the 
centre and on paying subsidies for it to run it (Interview 43).  
 
Two inter-related problems stemmed from USAASA’s myopic focus on 
‘technology dumping’. First, that the community organisations often did not 
have the capacity to run the telecentres. Second, in most situations the 
telecentres could be run as sustainable businesses – that is, the income 
generated did not cover the costs. 
USAASA did not subsidise the operational costs of the telecentres, beyond 
paying for the first year of internet. It did not pay salaries. As a result many 
telecentres were managed by incapacitated and unpaid volunteers from the 
local community, who were often hired on an ad hoc basis and that would quit 
if they got a paid job somewhere else (interview 4, 17 and 18).  The USAASA 
provincial representative stated: 
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The number one challenge for the telecentres is the telecentre management and 
ownership. Because we do not pay for salaries many centres are run by 
volunteers. But you cannot have volunteers forever and the type of people you 
are attracting if you are not paying also says something (Interview 10).  
The Head of the USAF reiterated this point: 
Many centres are run by a community based organisations and in those 
circumstances you get challenges because they lack capacity and sometimes it 
disintegrates and its only one person left so it is no continuity (Interview 43). 
 
 
USAASA’s provincial representative pointed to the telecentre in Inanda as the 
exception, but these are aberrations that are due to the exceptional abilities of 
the particular individual or organization Isibani Solunto that paid salaries to the 
staff: 
 
There are some centres, take Inanda for example, that are successful because 
the telecentre manager is competent. But she is also paid a salary and that is 
why she is staying there. If she wasn’t paid she would go elsewhere and the 
next person who would go in there would not be at the same level and as a 
result the centre will go down. I have seen telecentres flourishing, doing so 
well, and then you remove the person who is running it and it goes down. So 
that is a major challenge (Interview 10). 
 
 
The findings in this thesis suggest that in many situations it was difficult or 
impossible to run the telecentre as a sustainable business. None of the 
telecentres I visited were run as a business and all the telecentre managers 
believed this would not be possible because of the high level of poverty, low 
level of ICT awareness and relatively high price of ICT services. One of the 
telecentre managers in Sicabazini stated that: ‘USAASA wants us to provide 
services to the community, but at the same time wants us to work as a business 
and pay our own salaries. How can we do that?’ (Interview 17).   
Even officials in USAASA admitted their model was problematic. USAASA’s 
provincial representative stated:  
We want the telecentres to run as a business, but at the same time we 
cannot allow a situation where the telecentres become too costly… 
Because the affordability is another issue, there has to be a balance 
between the profits and what the community is paying. The 
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community should pay reasonable prices, but on the other hand, the 
decision we took means that in the main these centres will be located in 
poor communities. If a person has ten Rands in his hand he thinks, 
must I buy food with this ten or should I communicate with my 
brother? (Interview 10). 
 
Bureaucrats in other government departments that I interviewed deemed 
USAASA’s approach unsustainable. The Manager of the Department of 
Economic Development in KwaZulu-Natal stated:  
We knew that the telecentre model implemented by USAASA had already 
failed. Telecentres were placed in poor rural communities where computers, 
photocopying and printing services were sold. The business model was not 
working because the prices you could actually charge in rural communities 
did not generate enough money to make it sustainable (Interview 24). 
 
Problems resulting from the lack of capacity among the local implementation 
agents and the failure of USAASA to subsidise the operating costs of 
telecentres were visible in the two unsuccessful telecentres visited during 
fieldwork. The telecentre in peri-urban Adams Mission had severe capacity 
problems. It had originally been given to a community-based organisation but 
this had disintegrated. During my fieldwork the telecentre was under the 
stewardship of a man from the community calling himself the ‘telecentre 
administrator’. He took care of all the decisions concerning the telecentre and 
its finances. On a day-to-day basis the telecentre was run by telecentre 
administrator’s tenant and grandson. They were working as volunteers 
because the centre did not make enough money to pay for their salaries. All 
three – the administrator,  his tenant and grandson – lacked the technical,  
managerial and operational capacities to effectively run the centre.  
The telecentre in rural Sicabazini was the most recently established in the 
sample. The manner is which it was set up indicates that USAASA had started 
to rethink their approach. Instead of being granted to a community 
organisation, it had been granted to a Johannesburg-based NGO called the 
PEACE foundation and it received technical support from a private company 
located in Durban called Vuvuzela Communication. Nevertheless, the 
telecentre was run on a day-to-day basis by two telecentre managers recruited 
from the local community. They worked as volunteers because the telecentre 
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did not make enough money to pay them salaries. The managers had limited 
technical and managerial skills. Vuvuzela was supposed to provide technical 
support,  but it was in conflict with the telecentre managers over the product 
they provided. The core reason for this conflict was that the community 
members had to pay for vouchers in order to use the computers. According to 
the telecentre managers the vouchers were too expensive given the high level 
of poverty in the community. The PEACE foundation did not provide 
operational funding to the telecentre. 
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the telecentre in Inanda stood out as an 
example of how the telecentre channel could work if it was implemented by a 
competent third party. It was run by a local NGO called Isibani Solunto that 
were subsidising services and paying the management. The manager of Isibani 
Solunto was also the manager of the telecentre. She was born and raised in 
Inanda, but had many years of experience from NGO and development work. 
The centre had a recruited and trained ‘ICT trainers’ from the community. 
These trainers were paid a salary and held courses in the telecentre. Isibani 
Solunto had also recruited and trained a technician to run a computer 
refurbishment centre, which provided technical support to the telecentre as 
well as to surrounding schools and households.  
This suggests the telecentre approach might have been much more successful if 
USAASA had provided more ongoing support to the telecentres beyond the 
point of delivery, such as paying salaries, subsidizing prices and providing 
capacity-building.  Moreover, they could have been more active in building 
partnerships with local and provincial government institutions. 
A central reason why USAASA did not provide support or build good 
partnerships around the centres was that it had a very top-heavy 
implementation structure and lacked the provincial structures to do this. As 
mentioned above, it only had one representative per province. In KwaZulu-
Natal, the provincial representative had the sole responsibility for coordinating, 
monitoring, evaluating and problem-solving in all of USAASA’s 23 telecentres 
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and 40 school computer labs spread throughout the province. As a result of 
these factors he admitted that he was largely unable to fulfil his role: 
I am the only person in the province so I am representing the organisation and doing 
everything USAASA does in the province. USAASA is supposed to coordinate, 
monitor, report and make recommendations. But there are no proper structures at the 
local level. You cannot expect one man to do all that (Interview 40). 
In addition, he had other tasks such as identifying underserved areas, 
establishing partnerships, cooperating with other actors, holding campaigns and 
making recommendations to the national level. As if these problems were not 
enough, the provincial representative had neither an operating budget, an 
office, ICT knowledge or a technical team.  
 
My informants made it clear that the telecentre channel had been unsuccessful 
and that USAASA had a poor reputation in the sector (Interviews 6, 8, 12, 17, 
18, 19, 22, 21, 24, 25, 28, 38, 41, 42 and 45).  This was especially frustrating 
since USAASA, by law, was solely responsible for spending contributions from 
the USAF.  Between 1999 and 2008 the operators contributed a total amount of 
636 million Rands (496 million NOK) to the USAF (USAASA 2008a; 
USAASA 2008b). However, the national treasury had only allocated 227 
million Rands to USAASA, which constitutes only approximately 35.7% of the 
total amount collected. A central reason was that the national Department and 
the treasury was unsatisfied with the poor performance of  USAASA and its 
inability to use the funds effectively (interview 41, 42, 43 and 44).  USAASA, 
however, claimed that they were not prioritized by the DoC and therefore had 
too little capacity to manage the fund in a more effective way (interview 10, 43 
and 44). They argued that they needed an increased operational budget in order 
to have the incentives necessary to attract the appropriate people to effectively 
manage the USAF. According to USAASA and the head of the PNC on ISAD, 
they had less attractive incentives than ICASA and the DoC (Interviews 42, 43 
and 44). Nevertheless, the consequence was that almost 409 million Rands (328 
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million NOK) specifically targeted at improving ICT access in poor areas 
remains unspent in the national treasury (ibid). The money was, however, not 
available to any agency other than USAASA. Some of my informants saw this 
as frustrating and the DoC, PNC on ISAD and DoE had together attempted to 
get access to the fund, but they had not yet managed to (Interview 41 and 42).  
In summary, the failure of the telecentre channel was due to three interrelated 
problems. Firstly, USAASA did not sufficiently consider whether the 
organisations that were given the telecentre were able to run them. In many 
cases they relied on unsuitable volunteers. Second, USAASA did not 
sufficiently attempt to build capacity within the telecentres. Third, USAASA 
did not pay sufficient attention to whether it would actually be possible for the 
telecentres to be run as sustainable businesses. All of these deficiencies were 
evident in the telecentres where I undertook fieldwork. The two unsuccessful 
centres were run by local volunteers who lacked the capacity, funds and 
support to run the centres, while the only successful telecentre in the sample 
was the one that had a capacitated, paid manager and received funding from an 
NGO to pay salaries and subsidize prices. 
These three factors can be related to the mandate of the USAF and the structure 
of the channel. Firstly, USAASA was established as a central financial agency 
that was supposed to pay subsidies and hence it only had one provincial 
representative per province. The structure of the organisation was largely 
unable to sustain the telecentres on the ground given the reliance of 
incapacitated third parties.  Secondly, the mandate of the USAF focussed on 
providing technology and not on the softer sides of technology transfers in 
terms of skills, capacity and operational funding, which were of the utmost 
importance to the telecentre channel’s long term success.   
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7.2 Market channel 
The intention of the market channel was to extend the fixed line and cell phone 
networks and provide voice telephony in households and pay phones, and 
internet connection with an E-rate discount in schools. The channel depended 
on the private companies and had a market structure. The key tool of service 
delivery to poor households and schools were the USOs of ICT companies.  
Salamon (2001) warned about the use of indirect tools that rely on private 
operators in the market when the overall goal is equity or redistribution. 
Nevertheless, in the market channel of South Africa’s ICT to the poor policy 
the key actors were the increasingly privatized company Telkom and the fully 
private cell phone companies. The fundamental objective of these operators 
was the maximisation of profits for the benefit of their shareholders. This is not 
easily reconciled with the objectives of the ICT to the poor policy.  
The successful implementation of the USOs would have been possible in two 
situations. Firstly, where there is the valid threat of sanctions for non-
compliance. This requires a regulator with sufficient capacity to effectively 
monitor the compliance of the companies with their USOs and sanction them if 
they do not comply. Secondly, where the implementation of the USOs was 
profitable to the companies and hence it was in their self-interest as private 
companies to fulfil them. In such a situation the USOs would become irrelevant 
and monitoring by the regulator would be unnecessary.  
The empirical data on which this thesis is based found that the key weakness in 
the market channel was the regulator, ICASA. It demonstrated a limited 
capacity to administer the increasingly complex regulatory framework, interact 
with the major companies and ensure compliance.  Several of my informants at 
the national level confirmed this point (Interviews 41, 44 and 45)   A quote by 




The main problem is that, sometimes when ICASA wants to do something 
progressively such as lowering the costs, you have these companies with all 
these resources taking ICASA to court. They spend years in court. And 
ICASA doesn’t have the best lawyers because it is not enough money there. 
ICASA doesn’t have the resources to engage with the big companies 
(Interview 41). 
 
According to my informants the DoC had prioritized capacitating the regulator 
ICASA over USAASA (interview 41, 42, 43, 44).  Nevertheless, while the 
capacity of the regulator had increased, major problems remained in crucial 
areas. The head of the PNC on ISAD stated: 
 
The DoC is struggling to capacitate the regulator and ICASA is still not there. We 
have managed to get there in terms of salaries. Until two years ago a councillor were 
paid at a chief director level. From last year he was paid at the Director General level 
and the budget was increased. We fought for that. To try and get the budget to 
capacitate ICASA to attract talents etc. Now, we are not yet there. ICASA still has 
some constraints in personnel and units (Interview 42).  
 
A unit within the regulator, which was very important for the pro-poor part of 
the ICT policy, was the compliance section for telecommunications. This unit 
was responsible for monitoring the compliance of the companies with USOs 
but it had severe capacity constraints. According to the Head of the Compliance 
Section: 
Capacity problems at ICASA include under-staffing in some critical 
divisions. (...) The unit meant to monitor telecommunications compliance 
currently has one officer and a manager responsible for monitoring 
compliance with over 500 licensees (Interview 45). 
 
This point was reiterated by the DoC: 
It is public knowledge that ICASA is not equipped with the necessary skills 
and resources to effectively monitor the companies. As you might know, it’s 
difficult to make the private sector work together because it is about turf and 
competition. (...) I am very concerned – we are losing time and we are falling 
behind (interview 41). 
 
 
As a result of this the regulator did not have the capacity to monitor the extent 
to which the companies complied with their USOs. The Head of the 
Compliance section stated:   
The short answer is that we are unable to assess the extent to which there has 
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been compliance with the obligations due to an incomplete regulatory 
framework and lack of capacity in key units (Interview 45).  
 
The inability of the regulator to effectively monitor the USOs can be seen as a 
contributing factor to the mixed results of the market channel in the three poor 
communities.   
During the process of managed liberalisation, the regulatory framework had 
become increasingly complex and different companies had been given different 
types of USOs. Telkom and later NEOTEL were supposed to provide fixed line 
access and an E-rate discount on internet services. The cell phone companies 
were given obligations to extend the cell phone networks and various types of 
operators had been granted USOs to connect schools to the internet. The 
companies seemed to have complied in varying degrees.  The increasingly 
complex regulatory framework combined with the limited capacity of the 
regulator visa-vis the companies had according to my informants contributed to 
the various levels of compliance (Interviews 41 and 45).  
The regulator had given Telkom a clear set of license obligations as a part of its 
license in 1997. These were supposed to be implemented before 2001 or else 
the company would be fined (Benjamin 2001; Hodge 2003). As a result 
Telkom had largely fulfilled its obligations by 2001. After the targets were 
fulfilled the government planned to introduce a second network operator to 
compete with Telkom and lower the prices. This process was, however, much 
slower than planned. The second national operator, NEOTEL, was not licensed 
until 2005, did not start operating until the middle of 2006 and was still 
operating on a very limited basis when I was conducting my fieldwork in 2008. 
As a result, the second national operator had not yet started to implement its 
USOs and Telkom retained its monopoly, continued to charge high prices and 
generated high profits for its shareholders. The Head of Corporate Affairs in 
USAASA, who had previously worked for Telkom as a lobbyist, explained: 
Telkom has, because of the fact that it had a monopoly stranglehold on 
bandwidth allocation and selling capacity, Telkom basically kept the prices 
high. There were certain products that were sold at a mark-up of 7-800% so 
101 
 
the profits were absolutely enormous and that was because the Americans 
were trying to protect their investment. They made a fortune when they sold 
their Telkom shares. That Telkom-government deal had an astronomical 
impact on affordability and accessibility and I’m sorry to say, but the last 
thing anyone’s mind was worrying about impoverished communities and 
really extending service (Interview 44). 
 
The high prices charged by Telkom meant that poor people were unable to pay 
their bills. This explains the high number of lines that were disconnected in 
disadvantaged areas (Hodge 2003; Makhaya and Roberts 2003). This might 
have contributed to the low level of access to working fixed lines in the three 
disadvantaged communities investigated during fieldwork.  
The Head of the PNC on ISAD explained that many of the problems with 
Telkom could have been avoided if the regulator was stronger: 
Telkom was given an exclusivity of five years, and during the five years they 
were supposed to roll out to the historically disadvantaged and under-serviced 
areas. But do not forget that there are certain things that the investors look for 
in terms of how are we going to recuperate in terms of investment? So as a 
government in a developing country you have to balance this. Are you 
pressurized by investors to make certain decisions? Look, in the end they 
have the money and can turn around and not invest and they have done that in 
a number of countries.  But we believe that there was some wisdom in 
granting Telkom exclusivity for five years, even though in the process we 
created a monster that was difficult to control. Even though Telkom rolled out 
and met the target that was set up in terms of fixed lines, the cost was high 
and many were disconnected because they could not afford to pay. This could 
have been avoided if we had a stronger regulator that was able to monitor 
Telkom (Interview 42).  
 
 
The weak capacity of the regulator also impacted upon the effectiveness of the 
USOs to provide internet access to schools. The regulatory framework had 
become increasingly complex in the post-apartheid era as the process of 
managed liberalisation unfolded. The various types of regulations did not have 
a compliance model, which made it increasingly difficult for the regulator to 
monitor the USOs. The lack of capacity and the complexity of the regulatory 
framework meant the regulator was unable to monitor the more recent USOs, 
including those to provide computer labs in schools. In fact, the regulator did 
not know to what extent the companies had fulfilled their obligations or not 
(Interview 46).  
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The regulator also had difficulties in implementing the E-rate. According to the 
Head of the Compliance within ICASA, the reason why the E-rate had not been 
implemented was that it had taken a long time to finalize the regulations and 
now that they were finalized there were disagreements over the interpretations 
of the regulations. He stated: 
The E-rate was not implementable because the requisite regulations had not 
been finalized. Now that they have been finalized, a new challenge that has 
emerged is centred on interpretation of the regulations. In a nutshell, the 
question is whether the discount can be offered to intermediaries or only offered 
directly to the schools? If it can be offered to the intermediaries, can it also be 
offered to licensees whose business model relies purely on acquiring spare 
capacity from other licensees? Lastly, on what elements is the discount 
applicable? Is it limited to the cost of data on the network or does it also include 
the cost of the equipment that is required in establishing and maintaining the 
connectivity for the schools? We do not yet have answers to all these questions 
(Interview 45). 
 
At first glance the cell phone companies appear to have been the exceptional 
success of the market channel. The companies provided more networks than 
they were obliged to by the USOs. Indeed, 91.4% of the respondents in the 
three case communities had a cell phone in the dwelling. It seems likely, 
however, that the expansion of cell phone networks happened because the 
companies made money from it, rather than because they were obliged to do so 
(see Esselaar and Gillwald 2007). What is more, these results were probably 
related to the nature of cell phone technology and the fact that it does not 
require massive investments in infrastructure as is the case with other ICTs 
such as fixed lines and internet. The improvement in cell phone connectivity is, 
therefore, would have occurred irrespective of the USOs or the role of the 
regulator in enforcing them. The fact that it was profitable to the companies to 
provide cell phone networks to poor communities can explain why access 
levels in the three disadvantaged communities were high.  
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the USOs would only be 
successful if the sector had a strong and capacitated regulator or if it was 
profitable for the companies to fulfil them. The discussion above indicates that 
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the partial failure of the market channel to provide fixed line telephones to 
households and internet to schools in poor areas was due to the weakness of the 
regulator relative to profit-motivated private ICT companies. This problem was 
exacerbated by the complexity of the implementation channel. The only 
situation in which the USOs had the desired effect was where it was profitable 
for the cell phone companies to fulfil their obligations.  
7.3 Education channel 
The intention of the education channel was to provide computers for 
administrative purposes and computer labs, as well as to train teachers to use 
them. My fieldwork in the three poor communities indicated that the education 
channel was quite successful in comparison to the market and telecentre 
channels. Despite complaints about slow delivery and limited budgets, the 
education channel had steadily provided computers, trained teachers, and 
monitored and supported the schools since its inception.  
The structure of the education channel was decentralized and hierarchical with 
clearly defined roles and relationships. The bureaucrats took orders from their 
superiors, executed these, monitored and then reported upwards. Hence, the 
manager on top knew the exact results of the channel, could control 
implementation through orders, and adjust budgets and priorities accordingly. 
Although, reporting often had to go though many people, it seemed, therefore, 
that implementation was easier to control and less complicated to execute than 
in the market-network structures of the market and the network structure of the 
telecentre channels. The schools were also assessed in terms of their e-
readiness before they were provided with computer labs. This meant that the 
schools that were delivered computer labs had proper security measures, 
electricity and trained teachers (interview 27, 30, 33 and 37). This ensured that 
the school was able to put the equipment it received into use. However, it also 
excluded a number of poor schools that were not e-ready because they lacked 
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electricity or security measures. The responsibility for providing the basic 
infrastructure rested with another unit within the DoE. The schools were also in 
a better state than the telecentres to operate the computers because the schools 
had paid teachers and a school budget, although often limited, to cover ongoing 
costs.   
Moreover, in the education channel the education bureaucrats also coordinated 
the action of external actors. In contrast to the market and telecentre channels 
that utilised central, weak stand-alone institutions with limited local structures, 
the education channel had a decentralized, integrated and seemingly more 
capacitated structure. The educational channel did from time-to-time organise 
external projects, which meant that private companies or other state institutions 
provided computer labs. This was often done as publicity stunts to improve the 
profile of companies. However, as long as these external projects went through 
the education channel, the education bureaucracy ensured that they took place 
in schools with sufficient electricity and security measures and were followed 





The overall research question posed in this thesis was: to what extent and why 
has South Africa’s post-apartheid ICT to the poor policy been successful?  To 
answer this question, the thesis has analyzed the intentions, tools and structures 
of the policy, the implementation process they framed and the results on the 
ground in three poor communities.  Based on this, some suggestions haven 
been made about why the results varied across the different channels varied.   
South Africa, like many other developing countries at the time, embarked on a 
policy of gradual liberalisation of the telecommunications sector in the 
immediate post-apartheid era. However, it was recognized that certain areas 
and people in the country were unprofitable to the private operators and were 
unlikely to be provided for if the market was left to its own devices. Therefore, 
a key intention of the post-apartheid telecommunication policy was to intervene 
in order to improve access among the poor.  
To achieve this, specific pro-poor tools and a pro-poor fund were adopted. 
Between 1999 and 2008 the ICT operators contributed a total amount of 636 
million Rands (496 million NOK) to the USAF (USAASA 2008a;USAASA 
2008b).  However, the national treasury had only allocated 227 million Rands 
to USAASA, approximately 35.7% of the total amount because of its inability 
to use the funds effectively (ibid). This means that almost 409 million Rands 
(328 million NOK) specifically targeted at improving ICT access in poor areas 
remains unspent in the national treasury. This thesis indicates that despite both 
political will and funding being in place, the ICT to the poor policy has been 
only partly successful. 
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8.1 To what extent have the ICT to the poor policy 
been successful? 
This thesis directed its attention to the tools and structures chosen for the 
implementation of the policy and argued that these can help explain the mixed 
results of the ICT to the poor policy.  Three channels had been adopted to 
provide ICT to poor communities: (i) the telecentre channel, which aimed at 
establishing telecentres in poor communities; (ii) the market channel, which 
aimed at providing access to voice telephony (fixed line and cellphones) in 
households and internet at an E-rate discount to schools; and (iii) the education 
channel, which aimed at providing schools with computers and training 
teachers.  
These channels utilised different tools and structures, which resulted in 
different results.  
Firstly, the findings indicate that the telecentre channel had been largely 
unsuccessful. It had only established 389 telecentres in poor communities, in 
the whole of South Africa, in eleven years despite access to a huge fund. 
Moreover, three USAASA employees that I interviewed during fieldwork 
admitted that many of the telecentres given to community organisations had 
problems (Interview 10, 44 and 45). This was also confirmed by other 
informants on the national, provincial and local level (Interviews 
6,8,12,17,18,19,22,21,24,25,28,38,41,42 and 45). Indeed, my fieldwork 
indicated that only one of the three of what USAASA considers the most 
successful telecentres in KwaZuluNatal was successful according to my 
criteria.  
The empirical data gathered when writing this thesis indicates that a central 
reason why the telecentre channel largely failed was that it relied on third 
parties for implementation at the local level and these often lacked the capacity 
to run the centres effectively. The third parties were also expected to run the 
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centre as a sustainable business and cover their own costs, but this was difficult 
given the high level of poverty in the communities, the low level of ICT 
awareness and the high prices. It might have been possible, however, to run the 
centres successfully if USAASA had subsidized staff salaries and prices, as 
well as provided capacity building and technical support to the centre. This 
would have entailed a very different structure at the local level. At present, 
USAASA only had one representative per province. The KwaZuluNatal 
representative that I encountered during my fieldwork was largely unable to 
provide adequate support to the telecentres.  
 
Secondly, the market channel had been largely successful in providing cell 
phones to households in the case communities. This seems to have been 
because it was profitable for the companies, rather than the design of the tools 
and structures. The market channel was less successful at providing sustained 
access to fixed line phones to households and internet at an E-rate to schools. 
These findings were confirmed by informants within and outside ICASA 
(Interviews 33, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45). The findings in this thesis indicate 
that a central reasons contributing to this result was the complex regulatory 
framework and the inability of the regulator to monitor the operators and ensure 
their compliance (Interviews 41, 42 and 45). In this situation the companies 
only complied when it was profitable for them to do so, because they were not 
afraid of sanctions from the regulator.  
Finally, the findings in this thesis indicate that the education channel had been 
relatively successful. It had provided 604 computer labs in schools in only three 
years in poor communities in KwaZulu-Natal (Interview 27). This is impressive 
compared to the performance of the telecentre channel in the past eleven years. 
In the three communities the schools had a more sustainable and capacitated 
structure than the telecentres. The teachers were paid a salary each month and 
the school would not just dissolve if one teacher found another job. This was 
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not the case with managers in the telecentres. This may have contributed to the 
fact that nine out of ten schools visited had a computer for administrative 
purposes, seven out of ten schools a computer lab that were used for teaching 
and learning, and two thousand teachers were trained annually. The most 
challenging aspect of the education channel seemed to be inadequate budgets 
and the slowness of the bureaucratic process (interview 27, 33 ansd 39). 
Another bottleneck seemed to be the limited capacity of the State Information 
and Technology Agency, which was supposed to procure the computers. An 
additional challenge was to ensure that the schools prioritized the maintenance 
of computers and the payment of the internet bills in the already tight school 
budgets. 
8.2 What can explain the results? 
As shown above, both political will and funding had been in place for the 
implementation of the ICT to the poor policy. However, it had still only been 
partly successful in the three poor communities. The telecentre and the market 
channels were less successful than the education channel. This thesis has 
argued that an important reason why the policy partly failed was the choice of 
tools and structures for implementation.  
The telecentre and the market channel both had centralized structures and relied 
on third parties, such as community organisations or private companies, for 
implementation at the local level. The implementation structures were thus 
complex and it was difficult to control the third parties. The community 
organisations seemed to lack the capacity to run the telecentres and the private 
companies seemed to lack the will to comply with the USOs. 
This implementability problem was exacerbated by the lack of capacity in the 
implementing state institutions. In the case of the market channel, the regulator 
was the weak link as it was largely unable to monitor compliance with the 
USOs. In the telecentre channel, USAASA’s provincial representative was the 
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weak link. USAASA only had one representative who was responsible for all 
the telecentres in the province. Due to the unrealistic scope of his job the 
KwaZulu-Natal representative was largely unable to provide support to the 
telecentres or to organize partnerships with other government departments at 
the provincial and local level in order to ameliorate the problems the telecentres 
had. 
The education channel, on the other hand, had a decentralized and tightly 
integrated structure. It did not rely on third parties with a lack of capacity or 
will for successful implementation, but rather on direct delivery through the 
educational bureaucracy to schools. Hence, all the actors in the chain worked 
towards the same purpose. Moreover, the schools were better equipped to run 
the computer lab as the teachers were paid and there was a budget to cover 
operating costs. It had, therefore, been relatively successful compared to the 
telecentre and market channels.  
This thesis, therefore, supports the very general argument postulated by 
Salamon (2001) that direct tools, which rely on hierarchic bureaucracies, tend 
to be easier to implement and more effective and than indirect tools relying on 
third parties in more complex market and network structures. The findings in 
this thesis further indicate that the use of indirect tools may be especially 
problematic in the context of South Africa, where state institutions are weak 
and often lack the capacity to manage indirect tools that rely on complex 
implementation structures such as markets and networks.  
8.3 Concluding remarks and policy recommendations 
It can be concluded that the ICT to the poor policy and its three implementation 
channels partly failed to improve access in the three poor communities. 
However, the findings on the ground are largely restricted to the three poor 
communities in the province of KwaZulu-Natal and can thus not automatically 
be transferred to other poor communities, provinces or countries in sub-
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Africa that use similar tools and structures. However, the communities were 
picked out because they were representative of poor communities in KwaZulu-
Natal and it is likely that similar results would be found in other poor 
communities in KwaZulu-Natal and maybe even in South Africa. It would 
indeed be an interesting for a larger follow-up study to see whether the findings 
hold for a greater sample of communities and provinces in South Africa. Since 
the telecommunication sector reform implemented in South Africa is part of a 
greater neoliberal telecommunications reform trend in developing countries 
(Noll 2000: 183), it is likely that the pro-poor tools and structures implemented 
in the South African telecommunications sector have also been chosen and 
implemented in other  developing countries. It would therefore be very 
interesting to undertake a comparative study where one compares the findings 
of this thesis with another developing country that has adopted the same tools 
and structures to see if similar conclusions are reached.   
A central aim of the policy analysis is to provide practical advice for policy 
improvements. With respect to the ICT to the poor policy in South Africa, 
certain policy improvements can be suggested in the light of my study: 
The way the telecentre channel worked at the time of the fieldwork can be 
understood as a bottleneck in the ICT to the poor policy. USAASA was the 
only agency with access to the USAF but, because of its weak local 
implementation structures, it where largely unable to use the fund. Hence, 
changing the way the telecentre channel operates or the mandate of USAASA 
seems crucial for the future success of the policy. One can imagine two 
possible future scenarios.  
The first is a scenario in which USAASA receives an increased operational 
budget and significantly capacitates its organisational structure at the local level 
in terms of more people, budgets and decision-making power. This local level 
should have the responsibility for the telecentres, including both building the 
capacity of staff and providing operational subsidies.  
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The second, and perhaps a more realistic alternative given the fiscal constraints 
of the GEAR to reduce state budgets, would be that USAASA withdraws to its 
role as a financial agency that pays subsidies. However, instead of channelling 
the fund through its own weak local structures, it could instead channel funds 
through existing government departments at the provincial and municipal level. 
In many cases these bodies have significant local structures and impressive ICT 
plans, but they lack the funds to execute them.  During fieldwork, I discovered 
several such initiatives within existing structures at the municipal and 
provincial level that could not be put into place due to the absence of resources.  
The first was of course the education channel, which could have extended their 
provision to schools if they had access to the USAF. The education channel 
was relatively successful, but its constraints where that it was slow and had 
insufficient budgets. Hence, USAF funding could have expanded the delivery 
through this channel. Another and related project that USAASA could have 
supported was a potential cooperation between the PDoE and Ethekwini 
municipality to connect schools to the internet. It had been in contact with the 
SMART project in Ethekweni Municipality, which has provided broadband in 
the city of Durban in preparation for the forthcoming football World Cup. 
Some of the access points were in previously disadvantaged areas.  Bureaucrats 
in the PDoE wanted to become a part of this project and ensure that the schools 
surrounding the access point were connected, but sufficient funding was not 
available to make this happen. Hence, USAASA could have been made 
available to this project to enable the municipality to provide internet to the 
schools in poor areas. Secondly, another provincial department called the 
Provincial Department of Economic Development had developed a digital hub 
strategy, but lacked the funds to implement it. Thirdly, the Provincial 
Department of Arts and Culture had started to provide computer labs to their 
libraries in disadvantaged areas, but where worried about what was going to 
happen when the money ran out. In other words, there where several initiatives 
at the provincial and municipal level with appropriate structures on the ground 
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to implement them successfully, but there was very little money to support 
them. Hence, instead of implementing the telecentre policy themselves, 
USAASA might have been better advised to follow its mandate as a financial 
institution and pay subsidies to other agencies that had more appropriate 
structures and capacities at the local level.  
With respect to the market channel, a simplification of the regulatory 
framework and a significant increase in the capacity of the regulator, and 
specifically the compliance section, seems to be necessary in order to make this 
channel work in the interest of the poor. Indeed, more recent trends in the 
communication sector indicate that the sector is improving in these respects. At 
the time of my fieldwork the regulator was in a process of reviewing the USOs 
because the new Telecommunications Act argued that imposing different 
obligations on different operators was contrary to the objective of competition 
on equal terms. The government had attempted to increase the capacity of the 
regulator, but when I was undertaking my research there were still capacity 
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9.3 List of informants  
Nr. Date Title Organisation Place 
1.  27.10.2008 Telecentre Administrator Adams Mission Telecentre Adams Mission 
2.  27.10.2008 Principal  Adams Mission Primary School Adams Mission 
3.  27.10.2008 Teacher Dr Nembola High School Adams Mission 
4.  28.10.2008 Telecentre Assistant Adams Mission Telecentre Adams Mission 
5.  28.10.2008 Principal Sapomelela Primary School Adams Mission 
6.  28.10.2008 Assistant Telecentre Manager Adams Mission Telecentre Adams Mission 
7.  28.10.2008 Teacher Adams College Adams Mission 
8.  31.10.2008 Telecentre Manager  Inanda Digital Hub Inanda 
9.  31.10.2008 Principal Amadhletu High School Inanda 
10.  02.11.2008 Provincial Representative USAASA Sicabazini 
11.  03.11.2008 Senior Officer Mbazwana Thusong Centre Mbazwana 
12.  04.11.2008 Manager Sicabazini Community Centre Sicabazini 
13.  04.11.2008 Entrepreneur  Vodacom Phone Shop Sicabazini 
14.  04.11.2008 Entrepreneur Vodacom Phone Shop Sicabazini 
15.  05.11.2008 Principal Esibonisweni Primary School Sicabazini 
16.  05.11.2008 Teacher Dumangeze High School Sicabazini 
17.  05.11.2008 Telecentre Manager 1 Sicabazini Telecentre Sicabazini 
18.  06.11.2008 Telecentre Manager 2  Sicabazini Telecentre Sicabazini 
19.  13.11.2008 Manager Vuvuzela Communications Durban 
20.  13.11.2008 Principal Langalilabele High school Inanda 
21.  13.11.2008 Teacher Ochlange High School  Inanda 
22.  13.11.2008 Technician and Trainer  Inanda Digital Hub Inanda 
23.  14.11.2008 Principal and Ward 
Councillor 
Mandlakayise Primary School Inanda 




25.  17.11.2008 Independent ICT Consultant Strategy and Project 
Development Services 
Phone  
26.  18.11.2008 Manager Provincial Department of Arts 
and Culture, Library Services 
Pietermaritzburg 
27.  18.11.2008 MST/ICT Manager  MST/ICT Section of the 
Provincial Department of 
Education 
Pietermaritzburg 
28.  18.11.2008 Master Student Department of Economic Durban 
119 
 
History and Internet Studies, 
University of KwaZuluNatal 
29.  18.11.2008 Local Councillor  Adams Mission  Isipingo 
30.  22.11.2008 ICT Coordinator  Pinetown District Manor Gardens 
31.  24.11.2008 ICT Manager Umkhanyakude District 
Municipality  
Mkuze 
32.  25.11.2008 Computer Cadet (in charge of 
computer lab)  
Manguzi Library Manguzi 
33.  25.11.2008 Chief Education Specialist 
and ICT Coordinator 




34.  25.11.2008 Local Councillor  Sicabazini Manguzi 
35.  25.11.2008 Local Economic Development 
Officer  




36.  25.11.2008 LED Officer Umhlabuyalingana 
Municipallity 
Manguzi 
37.  28.11.2008 Deputy Chief Education 
Specialist and ICT 
Coordinator in Umlazi 
District 
Umlazi School District  Umlazi 
38.  28.11.2008 Head of Smart Project Ethekweni Municipallity Durban 
39.  29.11.2008 Deputy Chief Education 
Specialist ICT 
Provincial Interdistrict ICT 
Committee 
Durban 
40.  29.11.2008 KZN Provincial 
Representative 
USA/USAASA Durban 
41.  08.12.2008 Deputy Director General, ICT 
Policy Development 
Department of Communication Pretoria 
42.  08.12.2008 Manager PNC on ISAD Pretoria 
43.  09.12.2008 Head of the USF Fund USA/USAASA Pretoria 
44.  09.12.2008 Head of Corporate Affairs USA/USAASA Pretoria 








1: Interview guides 
General interview guide to national and provincial bureaucrats14  
Intentions  
- A central intention in the legislative framework is to provide access among the poor, 
what is your agency doing to achieve this? 
- Do you have a specific strategy? 
- What are the specific targets and timeframes? 
Implementation structure 
- What is your agency doing in order to provide access to ICT in poor communities?  
- Could you describe the organisational structure of this agency at the local, provincial 
and national level? 
- How would you describe the relationship with the other central actors in the sector 
(ICASA, DoC and DoE)? 
Implementation process 
- When did you start to implement the policy? 
- Has your agency changed in the aftermath of the 3 legislative reforms in the sector? 
- Could you briefly describe how the different legislative reforms in the sector 
impacted on your agency’s work? 
Results of the Policy 
- What has the channel achieved in terms of results? 
- How many telecentres/cyberlabs in schools have you established/how many 
households have gotten a telephone because of the USOs and how many schools have 
been connected to the internet? /Where can I find information about this? 
- How many of these are successfull? 
- Do you consider the implementation and the results of the policy a success? What 
have been the challenges? 
Confrontation with results on the ground 
- I have conducted a fieldwork in three poor communities in KwaZulu-Natal and there I 
found that the E-rate is not being implemented? Is this true? Why is it so? What are 
the challenges? 
- I also found, that few schools had an internet connection despite the fact that this has 
been a key intention of the USOs. Why is this so? 
- I also found that few households had access to a fixed line phone in the dwelling. 
Why? 
- The implementation of the USOs on the cellphone companies seemed to have been 
relatively successfull. Why is this? 
- I also found that only two of the three telecentres I visited were successfull. Why do 
you think this is? What has been the challenges? 
- I also found that many of the schools had computerlab that were working relatively 
well and trained teachers. Why is this so? 
 
                                            
14 This was the general interview guide used to interview all the bureaucrats at the national level, but 
certain questions were modified depending on the role of the agency that the informant represented.   
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Interview guide to telecentre managers 
History 
- When was the telecentre established? 
- Has it been open since then? 
- How long have you been here? 
Actors 
- Who brought the computers? 
- Who do you turn to if you have a technical problem? 
- What is the role of USAASA for the telecentre? What does it provide? 
- Do you receive any support from other organisations or people? 
Operation 
- Do you receive a salary? (how?/from who?) 
- Have you recived training? (from who?) 
- Does the centre make a profit? (why not?) 
Equipment  
- How many computers do you have and how many of them are working? 
- Do you have an internet connection? 
Services and usage 
- What kind of services do you offer to the community? 
- Do you organize any training courses? (If yes, to whom? How many per week?) 
- What kind of people uses the different services? 
- Approximately how many people use the centre a day?  
Success and challenges 
- Would you consider the telecentre to be successful? (why not?) 
- What are the main challenges for the centre today 
Interview guide to teachers in schools 
Equipment, E-rate and training 
- Does this school have a computer for administrative purposes? 
- Does it have a computer lab? 
- Is the computer lab connected to the internet? 
- In 2001, the government decided that all public schools should get a 50% E-rate 
discount on their internet services. Have you heard about this? Does your school 
receive a 50% discount on your internet services? 
- Have any of the teachers in this school been trained by the Department of Education? 
History 
- When did you receive the computerlab? Who delivered it? 
- And the internet connection? From who? 
Operation 
- Who pays for the maintenance of the computers? Repairs? 
- Are the computers insured? 
- Have you receive any training or support from other actors? 
Usage  
- Is the computerlab used in teaching? In which subjects? 
- Is it open to other people after school? 
Challenges 
- What are the major challenges with the computerlab? 
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